Description
Hardware Trojan Horses that are software-exploitable can be inserted into microprocessors, allowing attackers to run unauthorized code or escalate privileges. Additionally, it has been demonstrated that attackers could observe certain microprocessor features - seemingly unrelated to the program's execution - to exfiltrate secrets or private data. So, even devices produced in secure foundries could be vulnerable to such attacks. A promising defense strategy involves implementing Hardware Security Modules that monitor the runtime behavior of microprocessors to detect ongoing attacks. But why do we need Hardware Security Modules? Are software-based solutions not sufficient? Hardware Security Modules are essential because if attackers manage to execute malicious code, they could bypass or disable software defenses, leading to privilege escalation and other serious consequences. In contrast, hardware-based countermeasures raise the bar significantly, as modifying fabricated chips is far more difficult than compromising software, making Hardware Security Module implementations a more robust and resilient defense mechanism.
Practical infos
Next sessions
-
Fine-grained dynamic partitioning against cache-based side channel attacks
Speaker : Nicolas Gaudin - Trasna
The growth of embedded systems takes advantage of architectural advances from modern processors to increase performance while maintaining a low power consumption. Among these advances is the introduction of cache memory into embedded systems. These memories speed up the memory accesses by temporarily storing data close to the execution core. Furthermore, data from different applications share the[…]-
SemSecuElec
-
Micro-architectural vulnerabilities
-
Hardware architecture
-
-
Side-Channel Based Disassembly on Complex Processors: From Microachitectural Characterization to Probabilistic Models
Speaker : Julien Maillard - CEA
Side-Channel Based Disassembly (SCBD) is a category of Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) that aims at recovering information on the code executed by a processor through the observation of physical side-channels such as power consumption or electromagnetic radiations. While traditional SCA often targets cryptographic keys, SCBD focuses on retrieving assembly code that can hardly be extracted via other[…]-
SemSecuElec
-
Side-channel
-
Hardware reverse
-
-
Conformité TEMPEST et compromission d’information au travers de l’arbre d’alimentation d’un équipement
Speaker : Tristan PECHERAU, David HARDY - Thalès
THALES conçoit des équipements cryptographiques et de radiocommunication tactiques, navales et aéronautiques, embarquant des éléments de chiffrement pour la sécurité des communications. Cette sécurité notamment d’un point de vue des émanations électromagnétiques est normée. Ces normes de sécurité de l’information, sont connues sous le nom de code “TEMPEST”, correspondant aux normes OTAN SDIP-27,[…] -
PhaseSCA: Exploiting Phase-Modulated Emanations in Side Channels
Speaker : Pierre Ayoub - LAAS-CNRS
In recent years, the limits of electromagnetic side-channel attacks have been significantly expanded.However, while there is a growing literature on increasing attack distance or performance, the discovery of new phenomenons about compromising electromagnetic emanations remains limited. In this work, we identify a novel form of modulation produced by unintentional electromagnetic emanations: phase[…]-
Side-channel
-