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  • This session has been presented April 24, 2026 (11:00 - 12:00).

Description

  • Speaker

    Côme Allart - Inria

Two major changes are currently taking place in the embedded processor ecosystem: open source with the RISC-V instruction set, which could replace the ARM one, and post-quantum cryptography (PQC), which could replace classic asymmetric cryptography algorithms to resist quantum computers.
In this context, this thesis investigates the improvement of embedded processor performance, generally for generic applications and more specifically for PQC-related applications. To this end, a model-driven design method is proposed.
More specifically, this work focuses on in-order processors with out-of-order execution completion. We worked on the open source CVA6 processor, maintained by the OpenHW Foundation, to improve the performance of an existing processor and share our modifications.
The first contribution is the creation of a model of CVA6 performance, cycle-accurate and easier to modify than the hardware description of this processor. This model allows a quick design space exploration and thus to refine the microarchitectural specifications. Once this step is complete, these specifications are implemented in the processor pipeline using the model as a reference to ensure the new pipeline meets performance expectations.
Applying this method has led to an improvement in the performance of the CVA6 processor, especially with the creation of a superscalar pipeline, delivering an average gain of 30% on a set of benchmarks including CoreMark, Dhrystone and the Embench suite. These modifications have been integrated into the official CVA6 repository.
Finally, this same method is used to the accelerate PQC execution in this embedded processor by implementing the support for new instructions dedicated to accelerating the NTT functions of the ML-DSA signature algorithm into its superscalar pipeline. This results in a performance gain of a factor of 5.
This thesis thus demonstrates the value of model-driven processor design.

Autre

Présentation en Français (slides en Anglais) 

Talk in French (slides in English)

Practical infos

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