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644 results

    • Seminar

    • SemSecuElec

    Do Not Trust Modern System-on-Chips - Electromagnetic fault injection against a System-on-Chip

    • May 10, 2019

    • INRIA - Salles Petri/Turing

    Speaker : Ronan Lashermes

    Electromagnetic fault injection (EMFI) is a well known technique to disturb the behavior of a chip and weaken its security. These attacks are still mostly done on simple microcontrollers since the fault effects is relatively simple and understood.Unlocking EMFI on modern System-on-Chips (SoCs), the fast and complex chips ubiquitous today, requires to understand the impact of the faults. In this[…]

    • Seminar

    • SemSecuElec

    Implémentations sécurisées et évaluation pré-silicium contre les attaques physiques.

    • February 04, 2022

    • Secure-IC - Web-conférence

    Speaker : Sofiane Takarabt

    Side-channel attacks remain a permanent threat against embedded systems, thus reliable protections should be implemented and must be minutely evaluated. In this presentation, we study different possible ways to evaluate against such threats. We show how an evaluation can be carried out to validate a security level of a protected hardware implementation. This approach allows us to estimate in[…]

    • Seminar

    • SemSecuElec

    Vers une meilleure compréhension de l’apprentissage profond appliqué aux attaques par observation

    • January 10, 2020

    • CEA - Salle Métivier

    Speaker : Loïc Masure

    Les attaques par observation (SCA) exploitent les failles d’une primitive cryptographique embarquée sur un composant (type carte à puce, IoT, …), en mesurant des grandeurs physiques qui dépendent indirectement de la valeur de la clé secrète. C’est pourquoi il est primordial pour les développeurs de proposer des contre-mesures adaptées et d’évaluer leur efficacité face à un attaquant potentiel.Au[…]

    • Seminar

    • SemSecuElec

    Schindler-Itoh/Wiemers revisited: recovering full RSA/ECC private key from noisy side-channel observations

    • September 28, 2018

    • NinjaLab - Salle Métivier

    Speaker : Victor Lomné et Thomas Roche

    Side-channel attacks on public-key cryptography (i.e. modular exponentiation for RSA or scalar multiplication for ECC) often boils down to distinguishing the 0s from the 1s in the binary representation of the secret exponent (resp. secret scalar).When state-of-the-art countermeasures are implemented, this detection must be errorless: thanks to masking techniques, erroneous masked exponents (resp.[…]

    • Seminar

    • SemSecuElec

    Code-based postquantum cryptography : candidates to standardization

    • April 23, 2021

    • INRIA - Web-Conférence

    Speaker : Nicolas Sendrier

    At the third round of the NIST standardization process, three candidates remain with a security based on error correcting codes, all are key exchange mechanisms. We will explore them according to their security assumptions and properties. Among them, we find an historical scheme (Classic McEliece), as well as schemes using sparse and quasi-cyclic matrices (BIKE and HQC). We will examine pros and[…]

    • Seminar

    • SemSecuElec

    Improved Blind Side-Channel Analysis by Exploitation of Joint Distributions of Leakages

    • April 05, 2019

    • Faculté des sciences de Limoges - Salles Pétri/Turing

    Speaker : Léo Reynaud

    Les attaques side channel classiques nécessitent généralement la connaissance du clair (ou du chiffré) afin de calculer des données internes qui seront comparées à des fuites. Des attaques permettent cependant de s’affranchir de ces connaissances, les attaques par distributions jointes. Ces attaques supposent un attaquant capable d’inverser le modèle de consommation, mais aucune connaissance sur[…]
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