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702 results

    • Seminar

    • SoSysec

    Automated verification of privacy-type properties for security protocols

    • March 16, 2018

    • Inria Center of the University of Rennes - - See the page of each talk for the room.

    Speaker : Ivan Gazeau (LORIA, Inria Nancy)

    The applied pi-calculus is a powerful framework to model protocols and to define security properties. In this symbolic model, it is possible to verify automatically complex security properties such as strong secrecy, anonymity and unlinkability properties which are based on equivalence of processes.In this talk, we will see an overview of a verification method used by a tool, Akiss. The tool is[…]
    • Seminar

    • SoSysec

    La protection des flux en télévision numérique

    • November 22, 2019

    • Inria Center of the University of Rennes - - See the page of each talk for the room.

    Speaker : Eric Desmicht (DGA)

    En télévision numérique, des flux numériques comportant de la vidéo sont mis à la disposition des utilisateurs via différents média (cable, satellite, TNT, IP…) et différentes techniques (broadcast, multicast, unicast, support numérique…). Pour garantir les revenus des opérateurs de télévision à péage proposant des contenus à forte valeur ajoutée, il est essentiel que seuls les consommateurs ayant[…]
    • Seminar

    • SoSysec

    A Compositional and Complete approach to Verifying Privacy Properties using the Applied Pi-calculus

    • February 08, 2019

    • Inria Center of the University of Rennes - - See the page of each talk for the room.

    Speaker : Ross Horne (University of Luxembourg)

    The pi-calculus was introduced for verifying cryptographic protocols by Abadi and Fournet in 2001. They proposed an equivalence technique, called bisimilarity, useful for verify privacy properties. It is widely acknowledged (cf. Paige and Tarjan 1987), that bisimilarity is more efficient to check than trace equivalence; however, surprisingly, tools based on the applied pi-calculus typically still[…]
    • Seminar

    • SoSysec

    How to decrypt without keys with GlobalPlatform SCP02 protocol

    • July 06, 2018

    • Inria Center of the University of Rennes - - See the page of each talk for the room.

    Speaker : par Loic Ferreira (Orange Labs, IRISA)

    The GlobalPlatform SCP02 protocol is a security protocol implemented in smart cards, and used by transport companies, in the banking world and by mobile network operators (UICC/SIM cards). We describe how to perform a padding oracle attack against SCP02. The attack allows an adversary to efficiently retrieve plaintext bytes from an encrypted data field. We provide results of our experiments done[…]
    • Seminar

    • SoSysec

    Breaking and fixing HB+DB: A Short Tale of Provable vs Experimental Security and Lightweight Designs

    • February 02, 2018

    • Inria Center of the University of Rennes - - See the page of each talk for the room.

    Speaker : Ioana Boureanu (University of Surrey)

    HB+ is a well-know authentication scheme purposely designed to be lightweight. However, HB+ is vulnerable to a key-recovery, man-in-the-middle (MiM) attack dubbed GRS. To this end, at WiSec2015, the HB+DB protocol added a distance-bounding dimension to HB+, which was experimentally shown to counteract the GRS attack.In this talk, we will exhibit however a number of security flaws in the HB+DB[…]
    • Seminar

    • SoSysec

    Private Set Intersection and Other Private Information Sharing Protocols

    • November 07, 2022

    • Inria Center of the University of Rennes - - See the page of each talk for the room.

    Speaker : Xavier Carpent (University of Nottingham)

    In this seminar, we will give an overview of Private Set Intersection (PSI), some of its constructions, use cases, and open research questions. The canonical PSI protocol allows Alice and Bob (both with their own set of elements) to interact in a way that Alice learns the intersection of the sets and nothing else. Numerous variants exist:cardinality of intersection only (how many elements in[…]