54 results
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Remote data extraction through retroreflector hardware implants
Speaker : François Sarrazin, Pierre Granier - University of Rennes, IETR (UMR 6164)
Electromagnetic leakage eavesdropping is an increasingly accessible attack vector due to the democratization of software-defined radio. "TEMPEST" attacks rely on passively listening to the unwanted electromagnetic emanations of a target (computer screen, low speed USB peripheral…) in order to retrieve the transmitted data. However, the range and properties of such leakages are unpredictable.[…]-
SemSecuElec
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TrustSoC : a heterogeneous secure-by-design SoC architecture
Speaker : Raphaële Milan - Université Jean Monnet Saint-Etienne, CNRS, Laboratoire Hubert Curien UMR 5516
Since the 1970s, the complexity of systems on a chip has grown significantly. In order to improve system performance, manufacturers are integrating an increasing number of heterogeneous components on a single silicon chip. The incorporation of these components renders SoCs highly versatile yet significantly complex. Their multipurpose nature makes them suitable for use in a variety of domains,[…]-
SemSecuElec
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FeFET based Logic-in-Memory design, methodologies, tools and open challenges
Speaker : Cédric Marchand - University of Lyon - Lyon Institute of Nanotechnology (UMR CNRS 5270)
Data-centric applications such as artificial intelligence and the Internet of Things (IoT) impose increasingly stringent demands on the performance, the security and the energy efficiency of modern computing architectures. Traditional approaches are often unable to keep pace with these requirements making necessary to explore innovative paradigms such as in-memory computing. This paradigm is[…]-
SemSecuElec
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(On) The Impact of the Micro-architecture on the Masking Countermeasure against Side-Channel Attacks
Speaker : Lorenzo Casalino - CentraleSupélec, IRISA, Inria (SUSHI team)
The masking countermeasure constitutes a provably secure approach against side-channel attacks. Nonetheless, in the software context, the micro-architecture underlying a given CPU potentially induces information leakages undermining the masking's proven security.In this seminar, I will present the research work developed during my Ph.D. at CEA-List in Grenoble. This work addresses, along two axes,[…]-
SemSecuElec
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Side-channel
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Micro-architectural vulnerabilities
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Code Encryption for Confidentiality and Execution Integrity down to Control Signals
Speaker : Théophile Gousselot - Mines Saint-Etienne, CEA, Leti, Centre CMP, F - 13541 Gardanne France
Embedded devices face software and physical fault injections to either extract or tamper with code in memory. The code execution and code intellectual property are threatened. Some existing countermeasures provide Control Flow Integrity (CFI) extended with the confidentiality and integrity of the instructions by chaining all of them through a cryptographic encryption primitive. While tampering[…]-
SemSecuElec
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Fault injection
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Micro-architectural vulnerabilities
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Hardware countermeasures
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Understanding and fighting fault injections with programming languages
Speaker : Sébastien Michelland - Université Grenoble Alpes, Grenoble INP, LCIS
Would your latest program produce correct results if I skipped a statement in it? Two? Corrupted a variable at random? Then it might not be robust against _fault injection attacks_, which target hardware directly and have such effects. To be fair, nothing really resists them; still, efforts in designing protections have come a long way, relying (perhaps surprisingly) in large part on hardening[…]-
SemSecuElec
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Fault injection
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