Description
Electromagnetic leakage eavesdropping is an increasingly accessible attack vector due to the democratization of software-defined radio. "TEMPEST" attacks rely on passively listening to the unwanted electromagnetic emanations of a target (computer screen, low speed USB peripheral…) in order to retrieve the transmitted data. However, the range and properties of such leakages are unpredictable. Therefore, hardware implants have been designed to covertly extract data in a more controlled and covert manner compared to opportunistic leakage, in return for a more invasive attack. In this talk, we will focus on recent progress regarding the development of hardware Trojans based on backscattering methods to remotely extract data. In particular, the case of multi-Trojans allowing the taping of different sources will be presented.
Infos pratiques
Prochains exposés
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Fine-grained dynamic partitioning against cache-based side channel attacks
Orateur : Nicolas Gaudin - Trasna
The growth of embedded systems takes advantage of architectural advances from modern processors to increase performance while maintaining a low power consumption. Among these advances is the introduction of cache memory into embedded systems. These memories speed up the memory accesses by temporarily storing data close to the execution core. Furthermore, data from different applications share the[…]-
SemSecuElec
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Micro-architectural vulnerabilities
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Hardware architecture
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Side-Channel Based Disassembly on Complex Processors: From Microachitectural Characterization to Probabilistic Models
Orateur : Julien Maillard - CEA
Side-Channel Based Disassembly (SCBD) is a category of Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) that aims at recovering information on the code executed by a processor through the observation of physical side-channels such as power consumption or electromagnetic radiations. While traditional SCA often targets cryptographic keys, SCBD focuses on retrieving assembly code that can hardly be extracted via other[…]-
SemSecuElec
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Side-channel
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Hardware reverse
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PhaseSCA: Exploiting Phase-Modulated Emanations in Side Channels
Orateur : Pierre Ayoub - LAAS-CNRS
In recent years, the limits of electromagnetic side-channel attacks have been significantly expanded.However, while there is a growing literature on increasing attack distance or performance, the discovery of new phenomenons about compromising electromagnetic emanations remains limited. In this work, we identify a novel form of modulation produced by unintentional electromagnetic emanations: phase[…]-
Side-channel
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