Description
Electromagnetic leakage eavesdropping is an increasingly accessible attack vector due to the democratization of software-defined radio. "TEMPEST" attacks rely on passively listening to the unwanted electromagnetic emanations of a target (computer screen, low speed USB peripheral…) in order to retrieve the transmitted data. However, the range and properties of such leakages are unpredictable. Therefore, hardware implants have been designed to covertly extract data in a more controlled and covert manner compared to opportunistic leakage, in return for a more invasive attack. In this talk, we will focus on recent progress regarding the development of hardware Trojans based on backscattering methods to remotely extract data. In particular, the case of multi-Trojans allowing the taping of different sources will be presented.
Infos pratiques
Prochains exposés
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ML-Based Hardware Trojan Detection in AI Accelerators via Power Side-Channel Analysis
Orateur : Yehya NASSER - IMT Atlantique
Our work discusses the security risks associated with outsourcing AI accelerator design due to the threat of hardware Trojans (HTs), a problem traditional testing methods fail to address. We introduce a novel solution based on Power Side-Channel Analysis (PSCA), where we collect and preprocess power traces by segmenting them and extracting features from both time and frequency domains. This[…]-
SemSecuElec
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Side-channel
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Machine learning
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Hardware trojan
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