43 résultats

  • PHOENIX : the first crypto-agile hardware solution for ML-KEM and HQC

    • 25 avril 2025 (11:00 - 12:00)

    • Inria Center of the University of Rennes - Espace de conférences

    Orateur : Antonio RAS

    The security of the public-key cryptography protecting today and tomorrow's communication is threatened by the advent of quantum computers. To address this challenge, post-quantum cryptography is employed to devise new quantum-resistant cryptosystems. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), which led the quantum-safe transition, has already standardized the first lattice KEM[…]
    • Cryptography

    • SemSecuElec

    • Hardware accelerator

  • Advanced techniques for fault injection attacks on integrated circuits

    • 25 avril 2025 (10:00 - 11:00)

    • Inria Center of the University of Rennes - Espace de conférences

    Orateur : Paul Grandamme - Laboratoire Hubert Curien, Université Jean Monnet

    The security of integrated circuits is evaluated through the implementation of attacks that exploit their inherent hardware vulnerabilities. Fault injection attacks represent a technique that is commonly employed for this purpose. These techniques permit an attacker to alter the nominal operation of the component in order to obtain confidential information. Firstly, we propose the utilisation of[…]
    • SemSecuElec

    • Fault injection

  • Measurement the thermal component of clock jitter used as entropy source by TRNGs

    • 28 février 2025 (11:00 - 12:00)

    • Inria Center of the University of Rennes - - IRISA - Salle Aurigny (D165)

    Orateur : Arturo GARAY - STMicroelectronics

    Introduction Measuring the thermal component of clock jitter as an entropy source for True Random Number Generators (TRNGs) is compulsory for the security and evaluation of clock-jitter based TRNGs. However, identifying and isolating the local thermal noise component from other noise sources, particularly flicker noise, while performing a precise measurement remains a challenge. Current[…]
    • SemSecuElec

    • TRNG

  • Covert Communication Channels Based On Hardware Trojans: Open-Source Dataset and AI-Based Detection

    • 28 février 2025 (10:00 - 11:00)

    • Inria Center of the University of Rennes - - IRISA - Salle Aurigny (D165)

    Orateur : Alan Díaz Rizo - Sorbonne Université Lip6

    The threat of Hardware Trojan-based Covert Channels (HT-CCs) presents a significant challenge to the security of wireless communications. In this work, we generate in hardware and make open-source a dataset for various HT-CC scenarios. The dataset represents transmissions from a HT-infected RF transceiver hiding a CC that leaks information. It encompasses a wide range of signal impairments, noise[…]
    • SemSecuElec

    • Machine learning

    • Hardware trojan

  • I know what your compiler did: Optimization Effects on Power Side-Channel Leakage for RISC-V

    • 24 janvier 2025 (11:00 - 12:00)

    • Inria Center of the University of Rennes - Espace de conférences

    Orateur : Ileana Buhan - Radboud University Nijmegen

    With the growing prevalence of software-based cryptographic implementations in high-level languages, understanding the role of architectural and micro-architectural components in side-channel security is critical. The role of compilers in case of software implementations towards contribution to side-channel leaks is not investigated. While timing-based side-channel leakage due to compiler effects[…]
    • SemSecuElec

    • Side-channel

  • Hardware Trojan Horses and Microarchitectural Side-Channel Attacks: Detection and Mitigation via Hardware-based Methodologies

    • 24 janvier 2025 (10:00 - 11:00)

    • Inria Center of the University of Rennes - Espace de conférences

    Orateur : Alessandro PALUMBO - CentraleSupélec, IRISA, Inria

    Hardware Trojan Horses that are software-exploitable can be inserted into microprocessors, allowing attackers to run unauthorized code or escalate privileges. Additionally, it has been demonstrated that attackers could observe certain microprocessor features - seemingly unrelated to the program's execution - to exfiltrate secrets or private data. So, even devices produced in secure foundries could[…]
    • SemSecuElec

    • Side-channel

    • Micro-architectural vulnerabilities

    • Hardware trojan