Description
In recent years, the limits of electromagnetic side-channel attacks have been significantly expanded.
However, while there is a growing literature on increasing attack distance or performance, the discovery of new phenomenons about compromising electromagnetic emanations remains limited.
In this work, we identify a novel form of modulation produced by unintentional electromagnetic emanations: phase-modulated emanations.
This observation allows us to extract a side-channel leakage that can be exploited to reveal secret cryptographic material.
We introduce a technique allowing us to exploit this side-channel in order to perform a full AES key recovery, using cheap and common hardware equipment like a software-defined radio.
Moreover, we demonstrate that the exploitation of this new phase leakage can be combined with traditional amplitude leakage to significantly increase attack performance.
While investigating the underlying phenomenon causing this unintentional modulation, we identified several prior works that have approached similar exploitation -- without being aware of each other.
Creating a bridge between older and recent work, we unveil the relationship between digital jitter and signal phase shift in the context of side-channel attacks and fill the gap between prior works from various research fields.
Practical infos
Next sessions
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Fine-grained dynamic partitioning against cache-based side channel attacks
Speaker : Nicolas Gaudin - Trasna
The growth of embedded systems takes advantage of architectural advances from modern processors to increase performance while maintaining a low power consumption. Among these advances is the introduction of cache memory into embedded systems. These memories speed up the memory accesses by temporarily storing data close to the execution core. Furthermore, data from different applications share the[…]-
SemSecuElec
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Micro-architectural vulnerabilities
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Hardware architecture
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Side-Channel Based Disassembly on Complex Processors: From Microachitectural Characterization to Probabilistic Models
Speaker : Julien Maillard - CEA
Side-Channel Based Disassembly (SCBD) is a category of Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) that aims at recovering information on the code executed by a processor through the observation of physical side-channels such as power consumption or electromagnetic radiations. While traditional SCA often targets cryptographic keys, SCBD focuses on retrieving assembly code that can hardly be extracted via other[…]-
SemSecuElec
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Side-channel
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Hardware reverse
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