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  • This session has been presented June 07, 2019.

Description

  • Speaker

    Elie Noumon Allini

The main purpose of cryptography is to ensure secure communication. In order to achieve this goal, cryptographic schemes make an intensive use of random numbers. Given that the security of these schemes highly depends on these numbers, it is important to produce high-quality random numbers. Knowing that most cryptographic modules are nowadays implemented in logic devices, we investigated True Random Number Generators (TRNGs) that can be implemented in this kind of technology. Because of the critical nature of TRNGs in cryptographic schemes, their source and their quality must be evaluated in details.
Historically, TRNGS were considered as black boxes which produce sequences of random numbers. There were therefore solely evaluated using statistical tests. However, this consideration turns out to be not acceptable for security. Modern approaches (e.g. AIS 31) consist in characterizing sources of randomness and randomness extraction mechanisms.
In this talk, we will highlight the main challenges and modern approaches in TRNG security evaluation. One of these challenges is the characterization of the source of randomness. It leads us to consider various electronic noises that need to be characterized and for which, the contribution to the overall entropy need to be assessed.

Practical infos

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