Description
IPsec allows a huge amount of flexibility in the ways in which its component cryptographic mechanisms can be combined to build a secure communications service. This may be good for supporting different security requirements but is potentially bad for security. We demonstrate the reality of this by describing efficient, plaintext-recovering attacks against all configurations of IPsec in which integrity protection is applied prior to encryption - so-called MAC-then-encrypt configurations. We report on the implementation of our attacks against a specific IPsec implementation, and reflect on the implications of our attacks for real-world IPsec deployments as well as for theoretical cryptography.
Next sessions
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CryptoVerif: a computationally-sound security protocol verifier
Speaker : Bruno Blanchet - Inria
CryptoVerif is a security protocol verifier sound in the computational model of cryptography. It produces proofs by sequences of games, like those done manually by cryptographers. It has an automatic proof strategy and can also be guided by the user. It provides a generic method for specifying security assumptions on many cryptographic primitives, and can prove secrecy, authentication, and[…]-
Cryptography
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