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718 results

    • Seminar

    • SoSysec

    Intrusion Detection Systems over an Encrypted Traffic: Problem and Solutions

    • December 06, 2019

    • Inria Center of the University of Rennes - - Room TBD

    Speaker : Sébastien Canard (Orange)

    Privacy and data confidentiality are today at the heart of many discussions. But such data protection should not be done at the detriment of other security aspects. In the context of network traffic, intrusion detection system becomes in particular totally blind when the traffic is encrypted, making clients again vulnerable to known threats and attacks. Reconciling security and privacy is then one[…]
    • Seminar

    • SoSysec

    Private Set Intersection and Other Private Information Sharing Protocols

    • November 07, 2022

    • Inria Center of the University of Rennes - - Room TBD

    Speaker : Xavier Carpent (University of Nottingham)

    In this seminar, we will give an overview of Private Set Intersection (PSI), some of its constructions, use cases, and open research questions. The canonical PSI protocol allows Alice and Bob (both with their own set of elements) to interact in a way that Alice learns the intersection of the sets and nothing else. Numerous variants exist:cardinality of intersection only (how many elements in[…]
    • Seminar

    • SoSysec

    Squirrel: a new approach to computer-assisted proofs of protocols in the computational model.

    • April 16, 2021

    • Inria Center of the University of Rennes - - Room TBD

    Speaker : David Baelde (ENS Cachan)

    Formal methods have brought several approaches for proving that security protocols ensure the expected security and privacy properties. Most of the resulting tools analyze protocols in symbolic models, aka. Dolev-Yao-style models. Security in the symbolic model does not imply security in the cryptographer’s standard model, the computational model, where attackers are arbitrary (PPTIME) Turing[…]
    • Seminar

    • SemSecuElec

    Post-Quantum Cryptography Hardware: Monolithic Implementations vs. Hardware-Software Co-Design

    • April 23, 2021

    • PQShield – United Kingdom - Web-Conférence

    Speaker : Markku-Juhani Saarinen

    At PQShield, we’ve developed dedicated coprocessor(s) for lattice schemes, hash-based signatures, and code-based cryptography. These cryptographic modules are commercial rather than academic and designed to meet customer specifications such as a specific performance profile or Common Criteria and FIPS security certification requirements.Hardware implementations of legacy RSA and Elliptic Curve[…]
    • Seminar

    • SemSecuElec

    True Random Number Generators enabled hardware security

    • March 29, 2019

    • Hardware Security and Cryptographic Processor Lab, Institute of Microelectronics, Tsinghua University, China - Métivier

    Speaker : Bohan Yang

    True randomness is all about unpredictability, which can neither be qualified nor quantified by examining statistics of a sequence of digits. Unpredictability is a property of random phenomena, which is measured in bits of information entropy. Application of randomness spans from art to numerical computing and system security. Random numbers enable various cryptographic algorithms, protocols and[…]
    • Seminar

    • SemSecuElec

    Security challenges and opportunities in emerging device technologies: a case study on flexible electronics

    • May 06, 2022

    • Leiden University, The Netherlands?, and KU Leuven, Belgium - Salle Pétri/Turing

    Speaker : Nele Mentens - KU Leuven, Belgium

    While traditional chips in bulk silicon technology are widely used for reliable and highly ef?cient systems, there are applications that call for devices in other technologies. On the one hand, novel device technologies need to be re-evaluated with respect to potential threats and attacks, and how these can be faced with existing and novel security solutions and methods. On the other hand,[…]