627 results

  • When Good Components Go Bad: Formally Secure CompilationDespite Dynamic Compromise

    • February 05, 2018

    • Inria Center of the University of Rennes - - Petri/Turing room

    Speaker : Catalin Hritcu (Inria Paris)

    We propose a new formal criterion for secure compilation, providing strong end-to-end security guarantees for components written in unsafe, low-level languages with C-style undefined behavior. Our criterion is the first to model dynamic compromise in a system of mutually distrustful components running with least privilege. Each component is protected from all the others until it becomes[…]
  • Breaking and fixing HB+DB: A Short Tale of Provable vs Experimental Security and Lightweight Designs

    • February 02, 2018

    • Inria Center of the University of Rennes - - Petri/Turing room

    Speaker : Ioana Boureanu (University of Surrey)

    HB+ is a well-know authentication scheme purposely designed to be lightweight. However, HB+ is vulnerable to a key-recovery, man-in-the-middle (MiM) attack dubbed GRS. To this end, at WiSec2015, the HB+DB protocol added a distance-bounding dimension to HB+, which was experimentally shown to counteract the GRS attack.In this talk, we will exhibit however a number of security flaws in the HB+DB[…]
  • Protocoles de PIR fondés sur des designs transversaux

    • February 02, 2018

    • IRMAR - Université de Rennes - Campus Beaulieu Bat. 22, RDC, Rennes - Amphi Lebesgue

    Speaker : julien lavauzelle - INRIA X

    Les protocoles de PIR (Private Information Retrieval) permettent à un utilisateur de récupérer des entrées d'une base de donnée externalisée, sans révéler d'information sur les entrées désirées. Si plusieurs serveurs sont utilisés pour le stockage, et s'ils ne coopèrent pas, une confidentialité inconditionnelle peut être atteinte grâce à des encodages spécifiques de la base de données.<br/> Dans[…]
  • Short McEliece key from algebraic geometry codes with automorphism

    • January 26, 2018

    • IRMAR - Université de Rennes - Campus Beaulieu Bat. 22, RDC, Rennes - Amphi Lebesgue

    Speaker : elise barelli - INRIA Saclay

    In 1978, McEliece introduced a public key encryption scheme based on linear codes and suggested to use classical Goppa codes, ie: subfield subcodes of algebraic geometric (AG) codes built on a curve of genus 0. This proposition remains secure and in order to have a generalization of classical Goppa codes, in 1996, H. Janwa and O. Moreno suggested to use subfield subcode of AG codes, which we call[…]
  • Attaques par invariants : comment choisir les constantes de tour pour s'en protéger

    • January 19, 2018

    • IRMAR - Université de Rennes - Campus Beaulieu Bat. 22, RDC, Rennes - Amphi Lebesgue

    Speaker : Anne Canteaut - Inria

    Many lightweight block ciphers apply a very simple key schedule in which the round keys only differ by addition of a round-specific constant. Generally, there is not much theory on how to choose appropriate constants. In fact, several of those schemes were recently broken using invariant attacks, i.e. invariant subspace or nonlinear invariant attacks. This work analyzes the resistance of such[…]
  • Soutenance de thèse : Algorithmes de recherche sur bases de données chiffrées

    • January 08, 2018

    • IRMAR - Université de Rennes - Campus Beaulieu Bat. 22, RDC, Rennes - Amphi Lebesgue

    Speaker : Raphaël Bost - Université Rennes 1

    La recherche sur les bases de données chiffrées vise à rendre e cace une tâche apparemment simple : déléguer le stockage de données à un serveur qui ne serait pas de con ance, tout en conservant des fonctionnalités de recherche. Avec le développement des services de stockage dans le Cloud, destinés aussi bien aux entreprises qu’aux individus, la mise au point de solutions e caces à ce problème est[…]