Description
Dilithium is a signature algorithm, considered post-quantum, and recently standardized under the name ML-DSA by NIST. Due to its security and performance, it is recommended in most use cases.
During this presentation, I will outline the main ideas behind two studies, conducted in collaboration with Andersson Calle-Vierra, Benoît Cogliati, and Louis Goubin, which provide a better understanding of Dilithium's practical security.
I show that by introducing an error during the generation of the Dilithium signature, it is possible to force the signer to provide “incorrect” signatures that reveal information about the secret key in the form of inequalities on its coefficients. We then reformulate the problem of recovering the secret key from incorrect signatures into a linear programming problem.
Among the data in the MLWE instance (A,t), which is at the heart of Dilithium's construction, the least significant part of t—denoted by t0—is not included in the public key and is formally considered part of the secret key. Knowing t_0 has no impact on Dilithium's black box security, but it does allow for much more effective side-channel attacks. I explain the main ideas for constructing an attack that finds t0 from Dilithium signatures, again by twisting linear programming tools.
Both of these results use linear programming techniques that are somewhat deviated from their traditional uses, which is quite unusual for cryptanalysis of public-key algorithms.
Practical infos
Next sessions
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Post-quantum day of the cryptography seminar
A scientific day devoted to post-quantum cryptography, held in the wake of the European Cyber Week, with talks more technical than those presented at the ECW. To register for lunch, please do so before oct 30th using this link. The event has been moved to the IRISA / Inria building, Room Aurigny (D165). You will need an ID card to enter the building. -
Chiffrement homomorphe à l'aide des groupes après Nuida
Speaker : Pierre Guillot - Ravel Technologies/Université de strasbourg
Nuida et d'autres ont montré comment on peut obtenir un protocole de chiffrement pleinement homomorphe si l'on sait chiffrer les éléments d'un groupe G convenable, tout en sachant faire l'opération de G "en homomorphe". Les exemples étaient jusqu'à présent limités au chiffrement d'un bit à la fois, avec beaucoup d'opérations à effectuer pour "simuler" les portes logiques usuelles. Je vais[…]-
Cryptography
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Post-Quantum Signatures from Symmetric-Key-Friendly Techniques: From MPC-in-the-Head to VOLE-in-the-Head
Speaker : Dung Bui - Northwestern University
The MPC-in-the-Head (MPCitH) paradigm turns a secure multiparty computation protocol into a zero-knowledge proof and, via Fiat–Shamir, into a signature scheme whose security relies only on symmetric-key primitives. The framework of Katz, Kolesnikov and Wang (KKW, CCS18), which moves most of the MPC work into a committed preprocessing phase that the verifier checks by opening all-but-one of the[…] -
Distinguishing and Attacking McEliece Cryptosystems Using GRS Codes with Higher-Weight Mask
Speaker : Michael Schaller - University of Zürich, Applied Algebra group
Due to the insecurity of McEliece cryptosystems instantiated with Generalized Reed-Solomon (GRS) codes, there have been several proposals of McEliece type systems that replace the permutation matrix by a matrix $M$ with larger row and column weight. In many of them, the secret key is still a GRS code.There have been successful attacks on some of those schemes with row and column weight between $1$[…] -
Nouveaux doctorants
Exposés courts des nouveaux doctorants (Elouan, Quentin, Eliot)