Description
The threat of quantum computers motivates the introduction of new hard problems for cryptography.
One promising candidate is the Isogeny problem: given two elliptic curves, compute a “nice’’ map between them, called an isogeny.
In this talk, we study classical attacks on this problem, specialised to supersingular elliptic curves, on which the security of current isogeny-based cryptography relies. In particular, we consider this problem as a path-finding problem in graphs of supersingular elliptic curves connected by isogenies. We first present the Delfs–Galbraith attack and some follow-ups, which leverage the fact that solving the Isogeny problem for curves defined over the base field is easier. We then detail ongoing work where this idea is extended to another family of curves, called oriented curves.
Practical infos
Next sessions
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Post-quantum day of the cryptography seminar
A scientific day devoted to post-quantum cryptography, held in the wake of the European Cyber Week, with talks more technical than those presented at the ECW. To register for lunch, please do so before oct 30th using this link. The event has been moved to the IRISA / Inria building, Room Aurigny (D165). You will need an ID card to enter the building. -
Chiffrement homomorphe à l'aide des groupes après Nuida
Speaker : Pierre Guillot - Ravel Technologies/Université de strasbourg
Nuida et d'autres ont montré comment on peut obtenir un protocole de chiffrement pleinement homomorphe si l'on sait chiffrer les éléments d'un groupe G convenable, tout en sachant faire l'opération de G "en homomorphe". Les exemples étaient jusqu'à présent limités au chiffrement d'un bit à la fois, avec beaucoup d'opérations à effectuer pour "simuler" les portes logiques usuelles. Je vais[…]-
Cryptography
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Post-Quantum Signatures from Symmetric-Key-Friendly Techniques: From MPC-in-the-Head to VOLE-in-the-Head
Speaker : Dung Bui - Northwestern University
The MPC-in-the-Head (MPCitH) paradigm turns a secure multiparty computation protocol into a zero-knowledge proof and, via Fiat–Shamir, into a signature scheme whose security relies only on symmetric-key primitives. The framework of Katz, Kolesnikov and Wang (KKW, CCS18), which moves most of the MPC work into a committed preprocessing phase that the verifier checks by opening all-but-one of the[…] -
Distinguishing and Attacking McEliece Cryptosystems Using GRS Codes with Higher-Weight Mask
Speaker : Michael Schaller - University of Zürich, Applied Algebra group
Due to the insecurity of McEliece cryptosystems instantiated with Generalized Reed-Solomon (GRS) codes, there have been several proposals of McEliece type systems that replace the permutation matrix by a matrix $M$ with larger row and column weight. In many of them, the secret key is still a GRS code.There have been successful attacks on some of those schemes with row and column weight between $1$[…] -
Nouveaux doctorants
Exposés courts des nouveaux doctorants (Elouan, Quentin, Eliot)