Description
The main purpose of cryptography is to ensure secure communication. In order to achieve this goal, cryptographic schemes make an intensive use of random numbers. Given that the security of these schemes highly depends on these numbers, it is important to produce high-quality random numbers. Knowing that most cryptographic modules are nowadays implemented in logic devices, we investigated True Random Number Generators (TRNGs) that can be implemented in this kind of technology. Because of the critical nature of TRNGs in cryptographic schemes, their source and their quality must be evaluated in details.
Historically, TRNGS were considered as black boxes which produce sequences of random numbers. There were therefore solely evaluated using statistical tests. However, this consideration turns out to be not acceptable for security. Modern approaches (e.g. AIS 31) consist in characterizing sources of randomness and randomness extraction mechanisms.
In this talk, we will highlight the main challenges and modern approaches in TRNG security evaluation. One of these challenges is the characterization of the source of randomness. It leads us to consider various electronic noises that need to be characterized and for which, the contribution to the overall entropy need to be assessed.
Infos pratiques
Prochains exposés
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An Assessment of the Security of Reconfigurable Cloud Computing
Orateur : Russell Tessier - University of Massachusetts
In this talk, we examine efforts to protect network processing and computation in cloud-based FPGAs from hardware- and software-based attacks. FPGAs have served as integral components in cloud computing for a decade, even though commercial FPGA architectures were not designed for cloud deployment. A range of potential attacks on cloud-based FPGAs and their remediations are examined. We[…]-
SemSecuElec
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Overcoming Challenges in Advanced Application Processor Attacks Using PEM-Assisted LFI
Orateur : Jean-Max Dutertre - Ecole Mines Saint Etienne
Modern Application Processors (or SoC) are complex multi-cores devices that run application code through an operating system. Manufactured using advanced FinFET technology, they may feature billions of transistors. They also operate at clock frequencies of over 1 GHz. This complexity is often presented as a barrier against fault injection attacks. Indeed, a potential attacker, would face two main[…]-
SemSecuElec
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Fault injection
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Securing processor's microarchitecture against SCA in a post-quantum cryptography setting
Orateur : Vincent MIGLIORE - LAAS-CNRS
Hardware microarchitecture is a well-known source of side-channel leakages, providing a notable security reduction of standard cryptographic algorithms (e.g. AES) if not properly addressed by software or hardware. In this talk, we present new design approaches to harden processor's microarchitecture against power-based side-channel attacks, relying on configurable and cascadable building blocks[…]-
SemSecuElec
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Side-channel
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Micro-architectural vulnerabilities
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Compositional Semantics for Detection and Defense of Speculative Leaks
Orateur : Xaver Fabian - CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security
Speculative execution improves CPU performance but introduces vulnerabilities, known as Spectre attacks, which exploit microarchitectural side effects to leak sensitive data. Modern processors employ multiple interacting speculation mechanisms, yet existing approaches predominantly analyze them in isolation, which limits both the automated detection of complex leaks and the formal verification of[…]-
SemSecuElec
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Side-channel
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Micro-architectural vulnerabilities
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