Sommaire

  • Cet exposé a été présenté le 01 juillet 2011.

Description

  • Orateur

    Marion Daubrignard - Verimag

Providing security proofs instead of arguing lack of existing relevant attacks is a quite new approach when it comes to cryptography. In the last thirty years, a lot of work has been done to formalize security of systems and prove of the achievement of security criteria. It has resulted in the design of a great number of proofs under various hypotheses. Though a step in the right direction, these pencil-and-paper proofs are so numerous, involved and technical that the community has difficulty to carefully check them. The well-known example of the encryption scheme OAEP whose security proof, apparently correct, was corrected seven years after its publication illustrates that security-dedicated verification tools need to be designed. Our work takes place in the so-called computational model, where messages are considered to be bitstrings, and system adversaries are probabilistic Turing machines. A proof of security is then a complexity-theoretic reduction argument: the probability of success of an adversary in solving a security challenge is reduced to its ability to solve a known difficult problem (given a fixed amount of resources).  Firstly, we provide some intuition on usual security requirements, and common sketches of security proofs. Then, we present a semantics and a logic to formalize security proofs. One could say there are several levels in automatic proving: computer-aided verification of proofs, computer-aided design of proofs, and automatic generation of proofs. We show how our inference rules can be used to derive proofs and verify them automatically, or sometimes perform a proof search using some additional inputs.

Prochains exposés

  • Chiffrement homomorphe à l'aide des groupes après Nuida

    • 27 novembre 2026 (13:45 - 14:45)

    • IRMAR - Université de Rennes - Campus Beaulieu Bat. 22, RDC, Rennes - Amphi Lebesgue

    Orateur : Pierre Guillot - Ravel Technologies/Université de strasbourg

    Nuida et d'autres ont montré comment on peut obtenir un protocole de chiffrement pleinement homomorphe si l'on sait chiffrer les éléments d'un groupe G convenable, tout en sachant faire l'opération de G "en homomorphe". Les exemples étaient jusqu'à présent limités au chiffrement d'un bit à la fois, avec beaucoup d'opérations à effectuer pour "simuler" les portes logiques usuelles. Je vais[…]
    • Cryptography

  • Post-Quantum Signatures from Symmetric-Key-Friendly Techniques: From MPC-in-the-Head to VOLE-in-the-Head

    • 04 décembre 2026 (13:45 - 14:45)

    • IRMAR - Université de Rennes - Campus Beaulieu Bat. 22, RDC, Rennes - Amphi Lebesgue

    Orateur : Dung Bui - Northwestern University

    The MPC-in-the-Head (MPCitH) paradigm turns a secure multiparty computation protocol into a zero-knowledge proof and, via Fiat–Shamir, into a signature scheme whose security relies only on symmetric-key primitives. The framework of Katz, Kolesnikov and Wang (KKW, CCS18), which moves most of the MPC work into a committed preprocessing phase that the verifier checks by opening all-but-one of the[…]
  • Distinguishing and Attacking McEliece Cryptosystems Using GRS Codes with Higher-Weight Mask

    • 11 décembre 2026 (13:45 - 14:45)

    • IRMAR - Université de Rennes - Campus Beaulieu Bat. 22, RDC, Rennes - Amphi Lebesgue

    Orateur : Michael Schaller - University of Zürich, Applied Algebra group

    Due to the insecurity of McEliece cryptosystems instantiated with Generalized Reed-Solomon (GRS) codes, there have been several proposals of McEliece type systems that replace the permutation matrix by a matrix $M$ with larger row and column weight. In many of them, the secret key is still a GRS code.There have been successful attacks on some of those schemes with row and column weight between $1$[…]
  • Nouveaux doctorants

    • 08 janvier 2027 (13:45 - 14:45)

    • Salle Guernesey à l'ISTIC

    Exposés courts des nouveaux doctorants (Elouan, Quentin, Eliot)
Voir les exposés passés