Description
In recent years, the limits of electromagnetic side-channel attacks have been significantly expanded.
However, while there is a growing literature on increasing attack distance or performance, the discovery of new phenomenons about compromising electromagnetic emanations remains limited.
In this work, we identify a novel form of modulation produced by unintentional electromagnetic emanations: phase-modulated emanations.
This observation allows us to extract a side-channel leakage that can be exploited to reveal secret cryptographic material.
We introduce a technique allowing us to exploit this side-channel in order to perform a full AES key recovery, using cheap and common hardware equipment like a software-defined radio.
Moreover, we demonstrate that the exploitation of this new phase leakage can be combined with traditional amplitude leakage to significantly increase attack performance.
While investigating the underlying phenomenon causing this unintentional modulation, we identified several prior works that have approached similar exploitation -- without being aware of each other.
Creating a bridge between older and recent work, we unveil the relationship between digital jitter and signal phase shift in the context of side-channel attacks and fill the gap between prior works from various research fields.
Infos pratiques
Prochains exposés
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Onysis: A secure European SoC FPGA
Orateur : Adrien GRASSEIN - Nanoxplore
Developed in collaboration with the DGA, the Onysis project introduces a European SoC FPGA designed to embed advanced hardware security features. This presentation will provide an overview of the Onysis architecture, focusing specifically on its native mechanisms to protect critical systems. We will detail the implementation of its integrated security subsystem, covering the secure boot sequence[…]-
SemSecuElec
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Using High Level Profiling Data to Early Assess the Fault Tolerance of Complex Digital Components
Orateur : Luc NOIZETTE - Nuclétudes (filiale Ariane group)
This presentation outlines an innovative methodology for estimating the fault tolerance of complex components based on application profiling obtained using a high-level virtual platform. A derating factor, derived exclusively from profiling metrics (e.g., lifetime in memory and registers), is calibrated using a reliability dataset collected from a set of benchmarks. Applying it to test softwares[…]-
SemSecuElec
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Fault injection
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An Assessment of the Security of Reconfigurable Cloud Computing
Orateur : Russell Tessier - University of Massachusetts
In this talk, we examine efforts to protect network processing and computation in cloud-based FPGAs from hardware- and software-based attacks. FPGAs have served as integral components in cloud computing for a decade, even though commercial FPGA architectures were not designed for cloud deployment. A range of potential attacks on cloud-based FPGAs and their remediations are examined. We[…]-
SemSecuElec
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Securing processor's microarchitecture against SCA in a post-quantum cryptography setting
Orateur : Vincent MIGLIORE - LAAS-CNRS
Hardware microarchitecture is a well-known source of side-channel leakages, providing a notable security reduction of standard cryptographic algorithms (e.g. AES) if not properly addressed by software or hardware. In this talk, we present new design approaches to harden processor's microarchitecture against power-based side-channel attacks, relying on configurable and cascadable building blocks[…]-
SemSecuElec
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Side-channel
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Micro-architectural vulnerabilities
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Compositional Semantics for Detection and Defense of Speculative Leaks
Orateur : Xaver Fabian - CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security
Speculative execution improves CPU performance but introduces vulnerabilities, known as Spectre attacks, which exploit microarchitectural side effects to leak sensitive data. Modern processors employ multiple interacting speculation mechanisms, yet existing approaches predominantly analyze them in isolation, which limits both the automated detection of complex leaks and the formal verification of[…]-
SemSecuElec
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Side-channel
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Micro-architectural vulnerabilities
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