Description
In recent years, the limits of electromagnetic side-channel attacks have been significantly expanded.
However, while there is a growing literature on increasing attack distance or performance, the discovery of new phenomenons about compromising electromagnetic emanations remains limited.
In this work, we identify a novel form of modulation produced by unintentional electromagnetic emanations: phase-modulated emanations.
This observation allows us to extract a side-channel leakage that can be exploited to reveal secret cryptographic material.
We introduce a technique allowing us to exploit this side-channel in order to perform a full AES key recovery, using cheap and common hardware equipment like a software-defined radio.
Moreover, we demonstrate that the exploitation of this new phase leakage can be combined with traditional amplitude leakage to significantly increase attack performance.
While investigating the underlying phenomenon causing this unintentional modulation, we identified several prior works that have approached similar exploitation -- without being aware of each other.
Creating a bridge between older and recent work, we unveil the relationship between digital jitter and signal phase shift in the context of side-channel attacks and fill the gap between prior works from various research fields.
Infos pratiques
Prochains exposés
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Protection des processeurs modernes face à la vulnérabilité Spectre
Orateur : Herinomena ANDRIANATREHINA - Inria
Dans la quête permanente d'une puissance de calcul plus rapide, les processeurs modernes utilisent des techniques permettant d'exploiter au maximum leurs ressources. Parmi ces techniques, l'exécution spéculative tente de prédire le résultat des instructions dont l'issue n'est pas encore connue, mais dont dépend la suite du programme. Cela permet au processeur d'éviter d'être inactif. Cependant,[…]-
SemSecuElec
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Micro-architectural vulnerabilities
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Post-Quantum Cryptography Accelerated by a Superscalar RISC-V Processor
Orateur : Côme Allart - Inria
Two major changes are currently taking place in the embedded processor ecosystem: open source with the RISC-V instruction set, which could replace the ARM one, and post-quantum cryptography (PQC), which could replace classic asymmetric cryptography algorithms to resist quantum computers.In this context, this thesis investigates the improvement of embedded processor performance, generally for[…]-
SemSecuElec
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Implementation of cryptographic algorithm
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Chamois: Formally verified compilation for optimisation and security
Orateur : David MONNIAUX - CNRS - Verimag
Embedded programs (including those on smart cards) are often developed in C and then compiled for the embedded processor. Sometimes they are modified by hand to incorporate countermeasures (fault attacks, etc.), but care must be taken to ensure that this does not disrupt normal program execution and that the countermeasure is actually adequate for blocking the attacks.In the process, it is[…]-
SemSecuElec
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Fault injection
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Formal methods
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Securing processor's microarchitecture against SCA in a post-quantum cryptography setting
Orateur : Vincent MIGLIORE - LAAS-CNRS
Hardware microarchitecture is a well-known source of side-channel leakages, providing a notable security reduction of standard cryptographic algorithms (e.g. AES) if not properly addressed by software or hardware. In this talk, we present new design approaches to harden processor's microarchitecture against power-based side-channel attacks, relying on configurable and cascadable building blocks[…]-
SemSecuElec
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Side-channel
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Micro-architectural vulnerabilities
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