Description
The passwords that we use in our everyday life are often chosen to be easily memorable which makes them vulnerable to attacks. This problem is addressed by password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE). The general idea is to enable two parties who share the same (potentially weak) password to establish a strong session key. Most PAKE protocols used today are based on Diffie-Hellman key exchange in prime order groups, hence they are not secure against quantum attackers. A promising candidate for replacing Diffie-Hellman key exchange in a post-quantum world is the Commutative-Supersingular-Isogeny-Diffie-Hellman (CSIDH) key exchange. In this talk, we introduce two novel PAKE protocols based on CSIDH.
Prochains exposés
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Verification of Rust Cryptographic Implementations with Aeneas
Orateur : Aymeric Fromherz - Inria
From secure communications to online banking, cryptography is the cornerstone of most modern secure applications. Unfortunately, cryptographic design and implementation is notoriously error-prone, with a long history of design flaws, implementation bugs, and high-profile attacks. To address this issue, several projects proposed the use of formal verification techniques to statically ensure the[…] -
On the average hardness of SIVP for module lattices of fixed rank
Orateur : Radu Toma - Sorbonne Université
In joint work with Koen de Boer, Aurel Page, and Benjamin Wesolowski, we study the hardness of the approximate Shortest Independent Vectors Problem (SIVP) for random module lattices. We use here a natural notion of randomness as defined originally by Siegel through Haar measures. By proving a reduction, we show it is essentially as hard as the problem for arbitrary instances. While this was[…] -
Endomorphisms via Splittings
Orateur : Min-Yi Shen - No Affiliation
One of the fundamental hardness assumptions underlying isogeny-based cryptography is the problem of finding a non-trivial endomorphism of a given supersingular elliptic curve. In this talk, we show that the problem is related to the problem of finding a splitting of a principally polarised superspecial abelian surface. In particular, we provide formal security reductions and a proof-of-concept[…]-
Cryptography
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