Description
Side-channel attacks remain a permanent threat against embedded systems, thus reliable protections should be implemented and must be minutely evaluated. In this presentation, we study different possible ways to evaluate against such threats. We show how an evaluation can be carried out to validate a security level of a protected hardware implementation. This approach allows us to estimate in advance the expected security level on a real circuit. We explore an efficient and more exhaustive way to test a masked implementation against vulnerabilities induced by glitches. We took advantage in this approach to setup a better model for this phenomenon, and to explain the form of the generated leakage based on a spectral characterization that can be applied also to real acquisitions. This allows us to explain why standard leakage models are ineffective, and why a prior characterization is required to be able to exploit this kind of flaw. With this better understanding of the leakage, we can design more compact and robust functions, that we validate on simulated and real electromagnetic traces.
Infos pratiques
Prochains exposés
-
Sécurité physique du mécanisme d'encapsulation de clé Classic McEliece
Orateur : Brice Colombier - Laboratoire Hubert Curien, Université Jean Monnet, Saint-Étienne
Le mécanisme d'encapsulation de clé Classic McEliece faisait partie des candidats toujours en lice au dernier tour du processus de standardisation de la cryptographie post-quantique initié par le NIST en 2016. Fondé sur les codes correcteurs d'erreurs, en particulier autour du cryptosystème de Niederreiter, sa sécurité n'a pas été fondamentalement remise en cause. Néanmoins, un aspect important du[…]-
SemSecuElec
-
Implementation of cryptographic algorithm
-