687 résultats

• • Séminaire

  • SoSysec

  What you never wanted to know about vulnerability databases

  • 21 novembre 2025 (10:00 - 11:00)

  • Inria Center of the University of Rennes - Room Métivier

  Orateur : Henrik Plate - Endor Labs

  Vulnerability databases play a crucial role in modern software security, serving as the backbone for Application Security (AppSec) and Software Composition Analysis (SCA) tools. However, the accuracy and reliability of these databases vary significantly, often leading to misinformed security decisions. This talk explores the challenges associated with vulnerability databases, including incomplete[…]

  • Risk Assessment

  • SoSysec

  • Vulnerability management

• • Séminaire

  • Cryptographie

  Lightweight (AND, XOR) Implementations of Large-Degree S-boxes

  • 20 mars 2026 (13:45 - 14:45)

  • IRMAR - Université de Rennes - Campus Beaulieu Bat. 22, RDC, Rennes - Amphi Lebesgue

  Orateur : Marie Bolzer - LORIA

  The problem of finding a minimal circuit to implement a given function is one of the oldest in electronics. In cryptography, the focus is on small functions, especially on S-boxes which are classically the only non-linear functions in iterated block ciphers. In this work, we propose new ad-hoc automatic tools to look for lightweight implementations of non-linear functions on up to 5 variables for[…]

  • Cryptography

  • Symmetrical primitive

  • Implementation of cryptographic algorithm

• • Séminaire

  • Cryptographie

  Predicting Module-Lattice Reduction

  • 19 décembre 2025 (13:45 - 14:45)

  • Batiment 22-23 salle 16 (en face de l'amphi Lebesgue)

  Orateur : Paola de Perthuis - CWI

  Is module-lattice reduction better than unstructured lattice reduction? This question was highlighted as `Q8' in the Kyber NIST standardization submission (Avanzi et al., 2021), as potentially affecting the concrete security of Kyber and other module-lattice-based schemes. Foundational works on module-lattice reduction (Lee, Pellet-Mary, Stehlé, and Wallet, ASIACRYPT 2019; Mukherjee and Stephens[…]

  • Cryptography

• • Séminaire

  • SemSecuElec

  Passage à l’échelle des campagnes de simulations d’injections de fautes

  • 24 octobre 2025 (11:00 - 12:00)

  • IETR - University of Rennes - Campus de BEAULIEU - Bâtiment 11D, salle numéro 18

  Orateur : Ambre Iooss - Synacktiv

  Les injections de fautes constituent un vecteur d’attaque intéressant pour passer outre certaines protections lors de l’étude d’un système embarqué. Par exemple, corrompre le flot d’exécution d’un chargeur de démarrage peut permettre de passer outre une vérification de signature, et peut rendre possible l’exécution de code non signé. Dans le cas d’une exécution comportant un grand nombre d[…]

  • SemSecuElec

  • Fault injection

• • Séminaire

  • Cryptographie

  Structured-Seed Local Pseudorandom Generators and their Applications

  • 05 décembre 2025 (13:45 - 14:45)

  • IRMAR - Université de Rennes - Campus Beaulieu Bat. 22, RDC, Rennes - Amphi Lebesgue

  Orateur : Nikolas Melissaris - IRIF

  We introduce structured‑seed local pseudorandom generators (SSL-PRGs), pseudorandom generators whose seed is drawn from an efficiently sampleable, structured distribution rather than uniformly. This seemingly modest relaxation turns out to capture many known applications of local PRGs, yet it can be realized from a broader family of hardness assumptions. Our main technical contribution is a[…]

  • Cryptography

• • Séminaire

  • Cryptographie

  Wagner’s Algorithm Provably Runs in Subexponential Time for SIS^∞

  • 21 novembre 2025 (13:45 - 14:45)

  • IRMAR - Université de Rennes - Campus Beaulieu Bat. 22, RDC, Rennes - Amphi Lebesgue

  Orateur : Johanna Loyer - Inria Saclay

  At CRYPTO 2015, Kirchner and Fouque claimed that a carefully tuned variant of the Blum-Kalai-Wasserman (BKW) algorithm (JACM 2003) should solve the Learning with Errors problem (LWE) in slightly subexponential time for modulus q = poly(n) and narrow error distribution, when given enough LWE samples. Taking a modular view, one may regard BKW as a combination of Wagner’s algorithm (CRYPTO 2002), run[…]

  • Cryptography