649 résultats

  • Lattice-based NIST candidates: abstractions and ninja tricks

    • 23 avril 2021

    • IRMAR - Université de Rennes - Campus Beaulieu Bat. 22, RDC, Rennes - Amphi Lebesgue

    Orateur : Thomas Prest - PQShield

    I will present the remaining lattice-based candidates for standardization by NIST (2 signature schemes, 5 encryption schemes). At a high level, these can all be interpreted as straightforward instantiations of decades-old paradigms. But when we look under the hood, all of them make design choices which impact their security, efficiency and portability in distinct manners; we will discuss these.[…]
  • Post-Quantum Cryptography Hardware: Monolithic Implementations vs. Hardware-Software Co-Design

    • 23 avril 2021

    • PQShield – United Kingdom - Web-Conférence

    Orateur : Markku-Juhani Saarinen

    At PQShield, we’ve developed dedicated coprocessor(s) for lattice schemes, hash-based signatures, and code-based cryptography. These cryptographic modules are commercial rather than academic and designed to meet customer specifications such as a specific performance profile or Common Criteria and FIPS security certification requirements.Hardware implementations of legacy RSA and Elliptic Curve[…]
  • Lattice-based NIST candidates: abstractions and ninja tricks

    • 23 avril 2021

    • PQShield – United Kingdom - Web-Conférence

    Orateur : Thomas Prest

    I will present the remaining lattice-based candidates for standardization by NIST (2 signature schemes, 5 encryption schemes). At a high level, these can all be interpreted as straightforward instantiations of decades-old paradigms. But when we look under the hood, all of them make design choices which impact their security, efficiency and portability in distinct manners; we will discuss these.[…]
  • Squirrel: a new approach to computer-assisted proofs of protocols in the computational model.

    • 16 avril 2021

    • Inria Center of the University of Rennes - - Room TBD

    Orateur : David Baelde (ENS Cachan)

    Formal methods have brought several approaches for proving that security protocols ensure the expected security and privacy properties. Most of the resulting tools analyze protocols in symbolic models, aka. Dolev-Yao-style models. Security in the symbolic model does not imply security in the cryptographer’s standard model, the computational model, where attackers are arbitrary (PPTIME) Turing[…]
  • Les cyberopérations: entre technique et droit international. Attribution, preuve et responsabilité.

    • 02 avril 2021

    • Inria Center of the University of Rennes - - Room TBD

    Orateur : Anne-Thida Norodom (Professeur de droit public, Université de Paris)

    L’objet de cette intervention est de montrer à quel point le juridique est dépendant du technique lorsqu’il s’agit de réguler les cyberopérations. L’approche choisie sera celle du droit international public, c’est-à-dire du droit applicable entre Etats. Alors qu’il existe un consensus au niveau international sur l’applicabilité du droit international dans le domaine numérique, les négociations en[…]
  • SideLine and the advent of software-induced hardware attacks

    • 19 mars 2021

    • Mines Saint-Etienne – Thales - Web-Conférence

    Orateur : Joseph Gravellier

    In this talk, we will discuss software-induced hardware attacks and their impact for IoT, cloud and mobile security. More specifically, I will introduce SideLine, a new power side-channel attack vector that can be triggered remotely to infer cryptographic secrets. SideLine is based on the intentional misuse of delay-lines components embedded in SoCs that use external memory. I will explain how we[…]