Table of contents

  • This session has been presented June 16, 2017.

Description

  • Speaker

    Fabrice Mouhartem - Ens Lyon

Adaptive oblivious transfer (OT) is a protocol where a sender initially commits to a database M_1, …, M_N. Then, a receiver can query the sender up to k times with private indexes ρ_1, …, ρ_k so as to obtain M_{ρ_1}, …, M_{ρ_k} and nothing else. Moreover, for each i ∈ [k], the receiver’s choice ρ_i may depend on previously obtained messages {M_{ρ_j}}_{j< i} . Oblivious transfer with access control (OT-AC) is a flavor of adaptive OT where database records are protected by distinct access control policies that specify which credentials a receiver should obtain in order to acces each M_i. So far, all known OT-AC protocols only support access policies made of conjunctions or rely on ad hoc assumptions in pairing-friendly groups (or both). In this paper, we provide an OT-AC protocol where access policies may consist of any branching program of polynomial length, which is sufficient to realize any access policy in NC^1. The security of our protocol is proved under the Learning-with-Errors (LWE) and Short-Integer-Solution (SIS) assumptions. As a result of independent interest, we provide protocols for proving the correct evaluation of a committed branching program on a committed input. This is joint work with Benoît Libert, San Ling, Khoa Nguyen and Huaxiong Wang.

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