627 results

  • Solving the Tensor Isomorphism Problem for Special Orbits

    • November 08, 2024 (13:45 - 14:45)

    • IRMAR - Université de Rennes - Campus Beaulieu Bat. 22, RDC, Rennes - Amphi Lebesgue

    Speaker : Valerie Gilchrist - ULB

    Public key cryptography relies on using mathematical functions that are easy to compute but hard to invert. A recent work by D'Alconzo, Flamini, and Gangemi attempted to build such a function from tensors and use it to create a commitment scheme. In this talk, we will review their construction and present an attack on it, rendering it completely insecure. We will also offer an approach to[…]
    • Cryptography

    • Asymmetric primitive

    • Protocols

  • Improved Provable Reduction of NTRU and Hypercubic Lattices

    • October 18, 2024 (13:45 - 14:45)

    • IRMAR - Université de Rennes - Campus Beaulieu Bat. 22, RDC, Rennes - Amphi Lebesgue

    Speaker : Henry Bambury - ENS Paris

    Lattice-based cryptography typically uses lattices with special properties to improve efficiency.  We show how blockwise reduction can exploit lattices with special geometric properties, effectively reducing the required blocksize to solve the shortest vector problem to half of the lattice's rank, and in the case of the hypercubic lattice , further relaxing the approximation factor of blocks to . […]
    • Cryptography

    • Asymmetric primitive

  • (On) The Impact of the Micro-architecture on the Masking Countermeasure against Side-Channel Attacks

    • October 18, 2024 (11:00 - 12:00)

    • Inria Center of the University of Rennes - - Métivier room

    Speaker : Lorenzo Casalino - CentraleSupélec, IRISA, Inria (SUSHI team)

    The masking countermeasure constitutes a provably secure approach against side-channel attacks. Nonetheless, in the software context, the micro-architecture underlying a given CPU potentially induces information leakages undermining the masking's proven security.In this seminar, I will present the research work developed during my Ph.D. at CEA-List in Grenoble. This work addresses, along two axes,[…]
    • SemSecuElec

    • Side-channel

    • Micro-architectural vulnerabilities

  • Code Encryption for Confidentiality and Execution Integrity down to Control Signals

    • October 18, 2024 (10:00 - 11:00)

    • Inria Center of the University of Rennes - - Métivier room

    Speaker : Théophile Gousselot - Mines Saint-Etienne, CEA, Leti, Centre CMP, F - 13541 Gardanne France

    Embedded devices face software and physical fault injections to either extract or tamper with code in memory. The code execution and code intellectual property are threatened. Some existing countermeasures provide Control Flow Integrity (CFI) extended with the confidentiality and integrity of the instructions by chaining all of them through a cryptographic encryption primitive. While tampering[…]
    • SemSecuElec

    • Fault injection

    • Micro-architectural vulnerabilities

    • Hardware countermeasures

  • MinRank Gabidulin encryption scheme on matrix codes

    • October 11, 2024 (13:45 - 14:45)

    • IRMAR - Université de Rennes - Campus Beaulieu Bat. 22, RDC, Rennes - Amphi Lebesgue

    Speaker : Adrien Vinçotte - XLIM, Université de Limoges

    The McEliece scheme is a generic framework allowing to use any error correcting code which disposes of an efficient decoding algorithm to design an encryption scheme by hiding a generator matrix of this code.In the context of rank metric, we propose a generalization of the McEliece frame to matrix codes. From a vector code, we compute a matrix version of this code, that is hidden in such a way[…]
    • Cryptography

    • Asymmetric primitive

  • Adapting Identity-based Encryption with Wildcards to Access Control

    • October 04, 2024 (13:45 - 14:45)

    • Salle Guernesey à l'ISTIC

    Speaker : Anaïs Barthoulot - Université de Montpellier

    Nowadays, connected objects play an important role in our daily lives, providing services related to our cities, cars, homes, and health. For this purpose, they often need to be accessible by external entities, such as a garage owner (for a connected car), a postman (for a connected home), or a doctor (for a connected health device). However, it is crucial for the owner of such objects to retain[…]