Description
Microarchitectural optimizations, such as caches and speculative out-of-order execution, are essential for achieving high performance. However, these same mechanisms also open the door to attacks that can undermine software-enforced security policies. The current gold standard for defending against such attacks is the constant-time programming discipline, which prohibits secret-dependent control flow and memory accesses. While constant-time programming is widely used to secure cryptographic implementations against microarchitectural attacks, it has critical limitations. From a security perspective, it depends on assumptions about the underlying hardware and fails to provide protection against certain classes of attacks, such as Spectre. From a performance perspective, it incurs additional overheads, for example due to control-flow linearization. In this presentation, I will introduce recent hardware-software co-design approaches that mitigate the shortcomings of constant-time programming, moving toward more efficient and robust defenses. I will also discuss some remaining challenges to achieve provable, end-to-end security guarantees.
Prochains exposés
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Users Pay Twice: The Hidden Energy Cost of Web Advertising
Orateur : Samuel Pélissier - CentraleSupélec
Advertisements are everywhere on the Web: search engines promote results, most websites display ads, some require users to accept ads as a condition for access, video streaming services fund their infrastructure through an increasing volume of ads, and much of the gaming industry has adopted ad-based revenue models. In exchange for free access to a wide range of content, web users sacrifice their[…]-
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