Description
In November 2004, the European Network of Excellence for Cryptology (ECRYPT) launched a call for new stream cipher primitives. Authors from academia as well as industry submitted 34 designs, and in May 2008, 8 ciphers were chosen for the eSTREAM final portfolio. In this talk, we look back at the history of stream ciphers to understand the design choices made by cryptographers today. We start by reviewing "historical" designs based on linear feedback shift registers, such as the GSM A5/1 cipher. We explain basic cryptanalytic techniques - such as guess-and-determine attacks and correlation attacks - used to break LFSR-based ciphers. We also stop briefly to examine the importance of state size and key/IV length w.r.t. time-memory trade-offs. We then move on to the beginning of 2000s, which brought us new designs from the NESSIE research project, including SNOW 2.0, later to become the 3G mobile standard SNOW 3G. We discuss how new cryptanalytic tools, most notably algebraic cryptanalysis, reshaped design principles in modern ciphers, and review some of the eSTREAM submissions.<br/> In the second part of this talk, we focus on the cryptanalysis of one of the eSTREAM finalists, Moustique. We give a step-by-step overview of our attack that allows to recover the full 96-bit key in 2^{38} steps, using related keys, and allows to speed up exhaustive search in the standard case (without related keys) by a factor 28. Here, we invite the audience to interact, identify weaknesses that lead to the break and propose tweaks to thwart the attack. Cryptanalysis of Moustique is joint work with Vincent Rijmen, Tor E. Bjorstad, Christian Rechberger, Matt Robshaw and Gautham Sekar.
Next sessions
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Post-quantum day of the cryptography seminar
A scientific day devoted to post-quantum cryptography, held in the wake of the European Cyber Week, with talks more technical than those presented at the ECW. To register for lunch, please do so before oct 30th using this link. The event has been moved to the IRISA / Inria building, Room Aurigny (D165). You will need an ID card to enter the building. -
Chiffrement homomorphe à l'aide des groupes après Nuida
Speaker : Pierre Guillot - Ravel Technologies/Université de strasbourg
Nuida et d'autres ont montré comment on peut obtenir un protocole de chiffrement pleinement homomorphe si l'on sait chiffrer les éléments d'un groupe G convenable, tout en sachant faire l'opération de G "en homomorphe". Les exemples étaient jusqu'à présent limités au chiffrement d'un bit à la fois, avec beaucoup d'opérations à effectuer pour "simuler" les portes logiques usuelles. Je vais[…]-
Cryptography
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Post-Quantum Signatures from Symmetric-Key-Friendly Techniques: From MPC-in-the-Head to VOLE-in-the-Head
Speaker : Dung Bui - Northwestern University
The MPC-in-the-Head (MPCitH) paradigm turns a secure multiparty computation protocol into a zero-knowledge proof and, via Fiat–Shamir, into a signature scheme whose security relies only on symmetric-key primitives. The framework of Katz, Kolesnikov and Wang (KKW, CCS18), which moves most of the MPC work into a committed preprocessing phase that the verifier checks by opening all-but-one of the[…] -
Distinguishing and Attacking McEliece Cryptosystems Using GRS Codes with Higher-Weight Mask
Speaker : Michael Schaller - University of Zürich, Applied Algebra group
Due to the insecurity of McEliece cryptosystems instantiated with Generalized Reed-Solomon (GRS) codes, there have been several proposals of McEliece type systems that replace the permutation matrix by a matrix $M$ with larger row and column weight. In many of them, the secret key is still a GRS code.There have been successful attacks on some of those schemes with row and column weight between $1$[…] -
Nouveaux doctorants
Exposés courts des nouveaux doctorants (Elouan, Quentin, Eliot)