Description
The McEliece scheme is a generic framework allowing to use any error correcting code which disposes of an efficient decoding algorithm to design an encryption scheme by hiding a generator matrix of this code.
In the context of rank metric, we propose a generalization of the McEliece frame to matrix codes. From a vector code, we compute a matrix version of this code, that is hidden in such a way that the code obtained is indistinguishable from a random code. We propose to mask the linearity of the vector code on the extension, which implies a bigger public key (since the code is less structured) but allows to allows to keep a very small size of ciphertext. It results in an encryption scheme whose security relies on a generic instance of the MinRank problem, known to be NP-complete.
Applying it with Gabidulin codes, our approach gives a better trade-off between ciphertexts and public keys sizes than the classic McEliece scheme. For 128 bits of security, we propose parameters with ciphertext of size 65B and public key of size 98kB.
Travail en commun avec Nicolas Aragon, Alain Couvreur, Victor Dyseryn, Philippe Gaborit
Practical infos
Next sessions
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Post-quantum day of the cryptography seminar
A scientific day devoted to post-quantum cryptography, held in the wake of the European Cyber Week, with talks more technical than those presented at the ECW. To register for lunch, please do so before oct 30th using this link. The event has been moved to the IRISA / Inria building, Room Aurigny (D165). You will need an ID card to enter the building. -
Chiffrement homomorphe à l'aide des groupes après Nuida
Speaker : Pierre Guillot - Ravel Technologies/Université de strasbourg
Nuida et d'autres ont montré comment on peut obtenir un protocole de chiffrement pleinement homomorphe si l'on sait chiffrer les éléments d'un groupe G convenable, tout en sachant faire l'opération de G "en homomorphe". Les exemples étaient jusqu'à présent limités au chiffrement d'un bit à la fois, avec beaucoup d'opérations à effectuer pour "simuler" les portes logiques usuelles. Je vais[…]-
Cryptography
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Post-Quantum Signatures from Symmetric-Key-Friendly Techniques: From MPC-in-the-Head to VOLE-in-the-Head
Speaker : Dung Bui - Northwestern University
The MPC-in-the-Head (MPCitH) paradigm turns a secure multiparty computation protocol into a zero-knowledge proof and, via Fiat–Shamir, into a signature scheme whose security relies only on symmetric-key primitives. The framework of Katz, Kolesnikov and Wang (KKW, CCS18), which moves most of the MPC work into a committed preprocessing phase that the verifier checks by opening all-but-one of the[…] -
Distinguishing and Attacking McEliece Cryptosystems Using GRS Codes with Higher-Weight Mask
Speaker : Michael Schaller - University of Zürich, Applied Algebra group
Due to the insecurity of McEliece cryptosystems instantiated with Generalized Reed-Solomon (GRS) codes, there have been several proposals of McEliece type systems that replace the permutation matrix by a matrix $M$ with larger row and column weight. In many of them, the secret key is still a GRS code.There have been successful attacks on some of those schemes with row and column weight between $1$[…] -
Nouveaux doctorants
Exposés courts des nouveaux doctorants (Elouan, Quentin, Eliot)