Description
Embedded programs (including those on smart cards) are often developed in C and then compiled for the embedded processor. Sometimes they are modified by hand to incorporate countermeasures (fault attacks, etc.), but care must be taken to ensure that this does not disrupt normal program execution and that the countermeasure is actually adequate for blocking the attacks.
In the process, it is possible that the compiler used introduces bugs, or removes countermeasures seen as redundant by the optimisations.
CompCert is a formally verified C compiler meant for safety-critical applications. It applies only a moderate amount of optimizations and lacks optimization and security features available in mainstream compilers.
Chamois is an improved version of CompCert:
- many more optimizations
- security features such as return address authentication, stack canaries, landing pads
https://gricad-gitlab.univ-grenoble-alpes.fr/certicompil/Chamois-CompCert
Based on Chamois, we propose Chamois-Arsene, which can introduce control-flow integrity countermeasures and protections against fault attacks, with mathematical proofs and experimental analyses demonstrating the effectiveness of countermeasures.
https://gricad-gitlab.univ-grenoble-alpes.fr/certicompil/Chamois-Arsene
Présentation en Anglais (slides en Anglais)
Talk in English (slides in English)
Practical infos
Next sessions
-
An Assessment of the Security of Reconfigurable Cloud Computing
Speaker : Russell Tessier - University of Massachusetts
In this talk, we examine efforts to protect network processing and computation in cloud-based FPGAs from hardware- and software-based attacks. FPGAs have served as integral components in cloud computing for a decade, even though commercial FPGA architectures were not designed for cloud deployment. A range of potential attacks on cloud-based FPGAs and their remediations are examined. We[…]-
SemSecuElec
-
-
Overcoming Challenges in Advanced Application Processor Attacks Using PEM-Assisted LFI
Speaker : Jean-Max Dutertre - Ecole Mines Saint Etienne
Modern Application Processors (or SoC) are complex multi-cores devices that run application code through an operating system. Manufactured using advanced FinFET technology, they may feature billions of transistors. They also operate at clock frequencies of over 1 GHz. This complexity is often presented as a barrier against fault injection attacks. Indeed, a potential attacker, would face two main[…]-
SemSecuElec
-
Fault injection
-
-
Securing processor's microarchitecture against SCA in a post-quantum cryptography setting
Speaker : Vincent MIGLIORE - LAAS-CNRS
Hardware microarchitecture is a well-known source of side-channel leakages, providing a notable security reduction of standard cryptographic algorithms (e.g. AES) if not properly addressed by software or hardware. In this talk, we present new design approaches to harden processor's microarchitecture against power-based side-channel attacks, relying on configurable and cascadable building blocks[…]-
SemSecuElec
-
Side-channel
-
Micro-architectural vulnerabilities
-
-
Compositional Semantics for Detection and Defense of Speculative Leaks
Speaker : Xaver Fabian - CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security
Speculative execution improves CPU performance but introduces vulnerabilities, known as Spectre attacks, which exploit microarchitectural side effects to leak sensitive data. Modern processors employ multiple interacting speculation mechanisms, yet existing approaches predominantly analyze them in isolation, which limits both the automated detection of complex leaks and the formal verification of[…]-
SemSecuElec
-
Side-channel
-
Micro-architectural vulnerabilities
-