Sommaire

Description

  • Orateur

    Aymeric Fromherz - Inria

From secure communications to online banking, cryptography is the cornerstone of most modern secure applications. Unfortunately, cryptographic design and implementation is notoriously error-prone, with a long history of design flaws, implementation bugs, and high-profile attacks. To address this issue, several projects proposed the use of formal verification techniques to statically ensure the safety, correctness, and security of high-performance cryptographic implementations.
 

In this talk, we will particularly focus on recent efforts targeting cryptographic implementations written in Rust. We will discuss the benefits of using Rust as a source language for formal verification, and present Aeneas, a novel verification framework which translates safe Rust programs to semantically equivalent functional models, notably in the Lean proof assistant. We will conclude with an overview of the broader Aeneas ecosystem and its integration in software development processes, as well as recent applications to the development and verification of post-quantum cryptographic implementations.

Infos pratiques

  • Date

    13 février 2026 (13:45 - 14:45)
  • Emplacement

    IRMAR - Université de Rennes - Campus Beaulieu Bat. 22, RDC, Rennes Amphi Lebesgue
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Prochains exposés

  • Attacking the Supersingular Isogeny Problem: From the Delfs–Galbraith algorithm to oriented graphs

    • 23 janvier 2026 (13:45 - 14:45)

    • IRMAR - Université de Rennes - Campus Beaulieu Bat. 22, RDC, Rennes - Amphi Lebesgue

    Orateur : Arthur Herlédan Le Merdy - COSIC, KU Leuven

    The threat of quantum computers motivates the introduction of new hard problems for cryptography.One promising candidate is the Isogeny problem: given two elliptic curves, compute a “nice’’ map between them, called an isogeny.In this talk, we study classical attacks on this problem, specialised to supersingular elliptic curves, on which the security of current isogeny-based cryptography relies. In[…]
    • Cryptography

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