Description
At the historical foundation of isogeny-based cryptography lies a scheme known as CRS; a key exchange protocol based on class group actions on elliptic curves. Along with more efficient variants, such as CSIDH, this framework has emerged as a powerful building block for the construction of advanced post-quantum cryptographic primitives. Unfortunately, all protocols in this line of work are susceptible to subexponential quantum attacks, due to Kuperberg's algorithm. These attacks force us to work over large base fields, heavily impacting practical performance. We present a new method for evaluating the CSIDH group action, which admits several desirable cryptographic features (in particular, it is branchless, deterministic, dummy free, and constant time). We furthermore show that a natural extension of the algorithm allows to mitigate Kuperberg's attack, without increasing the size of the base field.
Infos pratiques
Prochains exposés
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TBA
Orateur : Eran Lambooij - Inria
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Cryptography
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TBA
Orateur : Anmoal Porwal - Technical University of Munich
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Cryptography
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Asymmetric primitive
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