Description
The masking countermeasure constitutes a provably secure approach against side-channel attacks. Nonetheless, in the software context, the micro-architecture underlying a given CPU potentially induces information leakages undermining the masking's proven security.
In this seminar, I will present the research work developed during my Ph.D. at CEA-List in Grenoble. This work addresses, along two axes, the problem of developing practically secure masked software.
The first axis targets the automated generation of masked software resilient to transition-based leakages, putting forward the employment of register allocation and instruction scheduling to mitigate such leakages during the compilation of the masked software.
The second axis focuses on the impact of the micro-architecture on alternative types of masking, studying their potential employment as a micro-architecture-independent approach to protect software implementations against both transition-based leakages and data parallelism; this latter an unexplored topic for masked software implementations.
I will conclude the seminar highlighting key points concerning the development of practically secure masked software and potential future developments of my research work.
Prochains exposés
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Fine-grained dynamic partitioning against cache-based side channel attacks
Orateur : Nicolas Gaudin - Trasna
The growth of embedded systems takes advantage of architectural advances from modern processors to increase performance while maintaining a low power consumption. Among these advances is the introduction of cache memory into embedded systems. These memories speed up the memory accesses by temporarily storing data close to the execution core. Furthermore, data from different applications share the[…]-
SemSecuElec
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Micro-architectural vulnerabilities
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Hardware architecture
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Side-Channel Based Disassembly on Complex Processors: From Microachitectural Characterization to Probabilistic Models
Orateur : Julien Maillard - CEA
Side-Channel Based Disassembly (SCBD) is a category of Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) that aims at recovering information on the code executed by a processor through the observation of physical side-channels such as power consumption or electromagnetic radiations. While traditional SCA often targets cryptographic keys, SCBD focuses on retrieving assembly code that can hardly be extracted via other[…]-
SemSecuElec
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Side-channel
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Hardware reverse
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PhaseSCA: Exploiting Phase-Modulated Emanations in Side Channels
Orateur : Pierre Ayoub - LAAS-CNRS
In recent years, the limits of electromagnetic side-channel attacks have been significantly expanded.However, while there is a growing literature on increasing attack distance or performance, the discovery of new phenomenons about compromising electromagnetic emanations remains limited. In this work, we identify a novel form of modulation produced by unintentional electromagnetic emanations: phase[…]-
Side-channel
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