Description
The security of quantum key distribution protocols is often defined in terms of the information an adversary obtains by measuring his system. Such definitions are fundamentally flawed because of a locking property of the accessible information: Giving the adversary a single bit of information may increase the accessible information by more than one bit. We give examples of keys that are not exposure-resilient and can thus not safely be used for one-time pad encryption, even though they satisfy a measurement-based security definition. In the second part of the talk, we discuss a universally composable security definition for cryptographic keys and show how this stronger type of security can be achieved.<br/> This is joint work with Andor Bariska, Ueli Maurer and Renato Renner.
Prochains exposés
-
Séminaire C2 à INRIA Paris
Emmanuel Thomé et Pierrick Gaudry Rachelle Heim Boissier Épiphane Nouetowa Dung Bui Plus d'infos sur https://seminaire-c2.inria.fr/ -
Attacking the Supersingular Isogeny Problem: From the Delfs–Galbraith algorithm to oriented graphs
Orateur : Arthur Herlédan Le Merdy - COSIC, KU Leuven
The threat of quantum computers motivates the introduction of new hard problems for cryptography.One promising candidate is the Isogeny problem: given two elliptic curves, compute a “nice’’ map between them, called an isogeny.In this talk, we study classical attacks on this problem, specialised to supersingular elliptic curves, on which the security of current isogeny-based cryptography relies. In[…]-
Cryptography
-