Description
The security of quantum key distribution protocols is often defined in terms of the information an adversary obtains by measuring his system. Such definitions are fundamentally flawed because of a locking property of the accessible information: Giving the adversary a single bit of information may increase the accessible information by more than one bit. We give examples of keys that are not exposure-resilient and can thus not safely be used for one-time pad encryption, even though they satisfy a measurement-based security definition. In the second part of the talk, we discuss a universally composable security definition for cryptographic keys and show how this stronger type of security can be achieved.<br/> This is joint work with Andor Bariska, Ueli Maurer and Renato Renner.
Next sessions
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MIKE: An efficient and compact NIKE Based on a Commutative Monoidal Action
Speaker : Jonathan Komada Eriksen - COSIC, KU Leuven
Robert recently described a powerful correspondence between certain (Hermitian) modules and (polarized) abelian varieties, which simultaneously generalizes both the class-group action underlying protocols such as CSIDH, and the Deuring correspondence, underlying protocols such as SQIsign. Using this correspondence, he also proposed how to construct a post-quantum NIKE, called MIKE, which, at a[…]-
Cryptography
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TBA
Speaker : Anmoal Porwal - Technical University of Munich
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Cryptography
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Asymmetric primitive
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