Description
Designing secure protocols based on passwords is a difficult task. Indeed, passwords, and more generally low-entropy secrets, are potentially vulnerable to guessing attacks, that is, exhaustive, "brute force" searches. Preventing guessing attacks typically requires a protocol to conceal any partial information on the password (e.g. its checksum) which could help the attacker confirm his guess during the searching process.<br/> Ensuring such a property is not obvious. Based on the seminal work of Lowe, several models and automatic tools have been proposed to analyze protocols with respect to guessing attacks. Unfortunately, these works rely on different symbolic models for which no computational justifications exist so far. (That is, a protocol may be secure in a symbolic model, and yet a feasible attack exists.) In this talk, we will study a recent, symbolic definition of security against guessing attacks, based on static equivalence. First, we will present a decision procedure for a large class of protocols, for a finite number of sessions. Then, we will provide a computational justification in the case of a passive adversary, that is, a pure eavesdropper. [This part is a joint work with M. Abadi and B. Warinschi.]
Next sessions
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SoK: Security of the Ascon Modes
Speaker : Charlotte Lefevre - Radboud University
The Ascon authenticated encryption scheme and hash function of Dobraunig et al (Journal of Cryptology 2021) were recently selected as winner of the NIST lightweight cryptography competition. The mode underlying Ascon authenticated encryption (Ascon-AE) resembles ideas of SpongeWrap, but not quite, and various works have investigated the generic security of Ascon-AE, all covering different attack[…] -
Comprehensive Modelling of Power Noise via Gaussian Processes with Applications to True Random Number Generators
Speaker : Maciej Skorski - Laboratoire Hubert Curien
The talk examines power noise modelling through Gaussian Processes for secure True Random Number Generators. While revisiting one-sided fractional Brownian motion, we obtain novel contributions by quantifying posterior uncertainty in exact analytical form, establishing quasi-stationary properties, and developing rigorous time-frequency analysis. These results are applied to model oscillator[…]-
Cryptography
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TRNG
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CryptoVerif: a computationally-sound security protocol verifier
Speaker : Bruno Blanchet - Inria
CryptoVerif is a security protocol verifier sound in the computational model of cryptography. It produces proofs by sequences of games, like those done manually by cryptographers. It has an automatic proof strategy and can also be guided by the user. It provides a generic method for specifying security assumptions on many cryptographic primitives, and can prove secrecy, authentication, and[…]-
Cryptography
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