Post-quantum cryptography based on supersingular isogeny problems?

The security of many cryptographic protocols in use today relies on the computational hardness of mathematical problems such as integer factorization. These problems can be solved using quantum computers, and therefore most of our security infrastructures will become completely insecure once quantum computers are built. Post-quantum cryptography aims at developing security protocols that will remain secure even after quantum computers are built. The biggest security agencies in the world including GCHQ and the NSA have recommended a move towards post-quantum protocols, and the new generation of cryptographic standards will aim at post-quantum security.<br/> In this talk I will discuss isogeny-based cryptography, a particular family of protocols that are considered for post-quantum security. Isogeny-based protocols have appealing properties including the shortest key sizes among post-quantum cryptography candidates, practical constructions for key exchange and signature, and a clear mathematical elegance.<br/> lien: http://desktop.visio.renater.fr/scopia?ID=725931***2130&autojoin