Description
An algebraic attack is a method for cryptanalysis which is based on finding and solving a system of nonlinear equations. Recently, algebraic attacks where found helpful in cryptanalysing stream ciphers based on linear feedback shift registers. The efficiency of these attacks greatly depends on the degree of the nonlinear equations.<br/> At Crypto 2003, Courtois proposed fast algebraic attacks. The main idea is to decrease the degree of the equations using a precomputation algorithm. Unfortunately, the correctness of the precomputation algorithm was neither proven, nor was it obvious in all cases. In the first part of the talk, an introduction to fast algebraic attacks is given. In the second part, the results introduced in the paper "Improving Fast Algebraic Attacks" (FSE 2004) are presented in more detail. This includes the missing proof of correctness and an improvement of the precomputation algorithm. All aspects will be illustrated on the Bluetooth keystream generator E_0.
Next sessions
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Verification of Rust Cryptographic Implementations with Aeneas
Speaker : Aymeric Fromherz - Inria
From secure communications to online banking, cryptography is the cornerstone of most modern secure applications. Unfortunately, cryptographic design and implementation is notoriously error-prone, with a long history of design flaws, implementation bugs, and high-profile attacks. To address this issue, several projects proposed the use of formal verification techniques to statically ensure the[…] -
On the average hardness of SIVP for module lattices of fixed rank
Speaker : Radu Toma - Sorbonne Université
In joint work with Koen de Boer, Aurel Page, and Benjamin Wesolowski, we study the hardness of the approximate Shortest Independent Vectors Problem (SIVP) for random module lattices. We use here a natural notion of randomness as defined originally by Siegel through Haar measures. By proving a reduction, we show it is essentially as hard as the problem for arbitrary instances. While this was[…] -
Endomorphisms via Splittings
Speaker : Min-Yi Shen - No Affiliation
One of the fundamental hardness assumptions underlying isogeny-based cryptography is the problem of finding a non-trivial endomorphism of a given supersingular elliptic curve. In this talk, we show that the problem is related to the problem of finding a splitting of a principally polarised superspecial abelian surface. In particular, we provide formal security reductions and a proof-of-concept[…]-
Cryptography
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