Description
Provable security becomes more and more popular in the cryptographic community. As exemplified by the NESSIE project, it is now common to see it as an attribute of a cryptosystem. Provable security is at the protocol level; a harder task may be to evaluate the security of a cryptosystem at the implementation level. Rather than considering a cryptosystem as a black-box, we may assume that some sensitive data can leak during the course of the execution of a (naively implemented) crypto-algorithm. A concrete example is given by the so-called side-channel analysis.<br/> Side-channel analysis is a powerful technique re-discovered by P. Kocher in 1996. The principle consists in monitoring some side-channel information like the running time, the power consumption, or the electromagnetic radiation. Next, from the monitored data, the attacker tries to deduce the inner-workings of the algorithm and thereby to retrieve some secret information. When there is a single measurement, the process is referred to as a simple side-channel analysis; and when there are several measurements handled together with statistical tools, the process is referred to as differential side-channel analysis.<br/> This talk is aimed at studying the resistance of elliptic curve cryptosystems against those two classes of attacks. In particular, we survey the various strategies proposed so far to prevent side-channel attacks.
Next sessions
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Some applications of linear programming to Dilithium
Speaker : Paco AZEVEDO OLIVEIRA - Thales & UVSQ
Dilithium is a signature algorithm, considered post-quantum, and recently standardized under the name ML-DSA by NIST. Due to its security and performance, it is recommended in most use cases. During this presentation, I will outline the main ideas behind two studies, conducted in collaboration with Andersson Calle-Vierra, Benoît Cogliati, and Louis Goubin, which provide a better understanding of[…] -
Wagner’s Algorithm Provably Runs in Subexponential Time for SIS^∞
Speaker : Johanna Loyer - Inria Saclay
At CRYPTO 2015, Kirchner and Fouque claimed that a carefully tuned variant of the Blum-Kalai-Wasserman (BKW) algorithm (JACM 2003) should solve the Learning with Errors problem (LWE) in slightly subexponential time for modulus q = poly(n) and narrow error distribution, when given enough LWE samples. Taking a modular view, one may regard BKW as a combination of Wagner’s algorithm (CRYPTO 2002), run[…]-
Cryptography
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CryptoVerif: a computationally-sound security protocol verifier
Speaker : Bruno Blanchet - Inria
CryptoVerif is a security protocol verifier sound in the computational model of cryptography. It produces proofs by sequences of games, like those done manually by cryptographers. It has an automatic proof strategy and can also be guided by the user. It provides a generic method for specifying security assumptions on many cryptographic primitives, and can prove secrecy, authentication, and[…]-
Cryptography
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Structured-Seed Local Pseudorandom Generators and their Applications
Speaker : Nikolas Melissaris - IRIF
We introduce structured‑seed local pseudorandom generators (SSL-PRGs), pseudorandom generators whose seed is drawn from an efficiently sampleable, structured distribution rather than uniformly. This seemingly modest relaxation turns out to capture many known applications of local PRGs, yet it can be realized from a broader family of hardness assumptions. Our main technical contribution is a[…]-
Cryptography
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Predicting Module-Lattice Reduction
Speaker : Paola de Perthuis - CWI
Is module-lattice reduction better than unstructured lattice reduction? This question was highlighted as `Q8' in the Kyber NIST standardization submission (Avanzi et al., 2021), as potentially affecting the concrete security of Kyber and other module-lattice-based schemes. Foundational works on module-lattice reduction (Lee, Pellet-Mary, Stehlé, and Wallet, ASIACRYPT 2019; Mukherjee and Stephens[…]-
Cryptography
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