November 20th, 2025

Optical Techniques
BITFLIP Conference

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November 20th, 2025
16:00

Le Refectoire

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MINES Saint-Étienne | Institut Mines-Télécom

Betrayed by light – Using Photon Emission Microscopy as an Enabler of Laser Fault Injection

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Context – Hardware security

- Hardware security – hardware attacks
- Secure HW: integrated circuits implementing security features
  - ✓ MCU with hardware cryptographic accelerator
  - ✓ Memory readback protection (IP & user data protection)



Context – Hardware security

- Hardware attacks
- Fault injections attacks
  - ✓ Information leakage (DFA) → secret key extraction
  - ✓ Control flow attacks (e.g., test inversion → memory extraction)



Context – Hardware security

- Hardware attacks
- Laser Fault Injection (LFI)
  - ✓ Accurate (µm accuracy) & efficient (bit-set/reset/flip)
  - → Finding the Point Of Interest = time consuming



This talk

- Failure analysis as a hardware attack facilitation tools?



- FA tool: photon emission analysis
  - ✓ Reverse engineering to accelerate fault injection attacks
  - ✓ LFI: where? and when?

  → Photon Emission Microscopy
  PEM

- Q? Use of PEM to accelerate LFI?

Betrayed by light – Using PEM as an Enabler of LFI

- Photon Emission (PE) basics

- PEM setup and imaging methodology
- PEM for LFI facilitation
- Conclusion

PE mechanism

- Photon emission from transistors activity
  - ✓ Source-drain electric field: charge carrier acceleration
  - ✓ Kinetic energy released as photons
  - ✓ MOS transistors in saturation mode (pinch-off channel, drain)
  - ✓ $NMOS_{emission} > PMOS_{emission}$



[Security of the IC Backside, D. Nedospasov, 2015]

FA tool: default localization (90s)

Also efficient to observe transistors in nominal mode

- ✓ Switching transistors (digital logic)
- ✓ Bias current of analog parts

+ tunneling effects (Fowler-Nordheim)

PE mechanism

Backside PEM (λ= 1-2 µm)

(to avoid reflection on metal lines and dummies)

- ✓ Si substrate transparent to NIR
- ✓ Substrate thinning improves SNR

Factors favorizing PE

- ✓ Current density
- ✓ V_{DS} voltage



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Betrayed by light – Using PEM as an Enabler of LFI

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Photon Emission Microscopy (PEM) setup



Setup:

- ✓ InGaAs camera for PEM + IR imaging
- ✓ LFI

Photon Emission Microscopy (PEM) setup

Photon Emission maps → transistors activity maps

Camera:

- ✓ 640x512 InGaAs sensor
- ✓ On a LFI bench

- ✓ Typical dark current (@-15 °C) : < 750 e^-/p/s
- ✓ Typical readout noise (rms) : 18 e^-
- ✓ High sensitivity from λ = 0.6 to 1.7 µm
- ✓ 15x15µm pixel pitch
- ✓ Peak Quantum Efficiency : >90% @ 1.3µm
- ✓ Air-cooled to -15 °C

PEM constraints

Signal to Noise Ratio

✓ Information shall emerge from noise

- PEM: long integration time w.r.t. target's activity

On a running device

→ execution of code loops

⇨ Strong constraints for attack purposes

→ gray box model:

- ✓ Ability to execute arbitrary code loops
- ✓ Synchronization

→ Reverse engineering tool

Imaging methodology

Target 1

Microcontroller:

- ✓ ARM Cortex M3
- ✓ CMOS 90 nm
- ✓ 32-bit CPU, 24 MHz
- ✓ 128 kBytes Flash
  page size = 1 kB
- ✓ 8 kBytes SRAM
- ✓ Si thickness: ~350 µm

Si die: 3,000 x 2,500 µm

Flash: 1,400 x 550 µm – 1.3 bits/µm²

SRAM: 245 x 660 µm (x2) – 0,1 bits/µm²

Backside IR view



POI = Point Of Interest

Imaging methodology

Signal and noise contributions





5s exposure, 5x lens, POI active, avg. 20x

Sensor output: $PEM_{sensor} = PEM_{POI} + Noise$ target+sensor+ambient

POI = Point Of Interest

Imaging methodology

Differential imaging: $PEM_{POI\ active} - PEM_{POI\ OFF}$ → POI activity





POI activity



5s exposure, 5x lens, POI active, avg. 20x

Betrayed by light – Using PEM as an Enabler of LFI

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PEM for LFI facilitation – Reverse engineering

PEM on target 1

- ✓ Quick mapping of target's key elements

Overlay PEM + IR view



PEM for LFI facilitation – Reverse engineering

PEM on target 1

- ✓ CPU core registers mapping



```
1 MOVS Rn, #0
2 MOVS R8, #FFFFFFFF
3 while (1) {
4     EORS Rn, Rn, R8
5 }
```

Lens x20, 5s (avg. 5x)
600 Mio. EORS
register R3

PEM for LFI facilitation – Reverse engineering

PEM on target 1

- ✓ CPU core registers mapping



Lens x20, 5s (avg. 5)
600 Mio. EORS
register R3

PEM for LFI facilitation – LFI

LFI from PEM-based register DFFs localization (target 1)



Pico-second laser source: 60 ps pulses

- ✓ 1,064 nm
- ✓ 0.12 nJ

R3 bytes identification



PEM for LFI facilitation – More results

Target 2 – 32-bit ARM Cortex M0+, CMOS 90 nm







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Betrayed by light – Using PEM as an Enabler of LFI

- Conclusion – PEM
  - ✓ Efficient reverse engineering of MCUs
  - ✓ Constraints
    - ✓ Backside, NIR imaging
    - ✓ Long integration times (code loops)
  - ✓ Integration into LFI setup

  - ✓ Mapping of CPU core registers + successful LFI

Contact:
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Betrayed by Light: How Photon Emission Microscopy Empowers Register Bit-level Laser Attacks on Microcontrollers, HOST 2025

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