

# Post-Quantum Public-Key Pseudorandom Correlation Functions for OT

Shweta Agrawal<sup>1</sup>, Kaartik Bhushan<sup>2</sup>, Geoffroy Couteau<sup>2</sup>, and  
Mahshid Riahinia<sup>3</sup>


<sup>1</sup>IIT Madras, India.

<sup>2</sup>Université Paris Cité, CNRS, IRIF, Paris, France.


<sup>3</sup>ENS, CNRS, visitor at IRIF, Paris, France.

# Introduction: Correlated Randomness


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


Symmetric Encryption




Oblivious Transfer (OT) Correlation

# Introduction: Correlated Randomness




Symmetric Encryption



Oblivious Transfer (OT) Correlation

2PC: 2-Party Computation


# Introduction: Correlated Randomness



Symmetric Encryption

**Secure Computation**


- party 1 has  $x$
- party 2 has  $y$
- Goal: compute  $f(x,y)$  without revealing  $x,y$



Oblivious Transfer (OT) Correlation

2PC: 2-Party Computation


# Introduction: Correlated Randomness



Symmetric Encryption

**Secure Computation**

- party 1 has  $x$
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
Oblivious Transfer (OT) Correlation

**Secure Communication**

2PC: 2-Party Computation

**Secure Computation**


# Introduction: Correlated Randomness



Symmetric Encryption

## Secure Computation

- party 1 has  $x$
- party 2 has  $y$
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
Oblivious Transfer (OT) Correlation

## Secure Communication

2PC: 2-Party Computation

## Fast & Info-Theoretic Secure Computation


# Introduction: Correlated Randomness



Symmetric Encryption

## Secure Computation

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Oblivious Transfer (OT) Correlation


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2PC: 2-Party Computation


## Fast & Info-Theoretic Secure Computation

*f has n gates : O(n) OT pairs -> send 4 bits per AND*


# Introduction: Correlated Randomness



Can we generate correlated randomness on demand?




# Introduction: Correlated Randomness



Symmetric Encryption


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Oblivious Transfer (OT) Correlation


- [BCGIKS 19] Pseudorandom Correlation Generators (PCGs)
- [BCGIKS 20] Pseudorandom Correlation Functions (PCFs)

# Introduction: Correlated Randomness



Symmetric Encryption

Can we generate correlated randomness on demand?



Oblivious Transfer (OT) Correlation

[BCGIKS 19] Pseudorandom Correlation Generators (PCGs)

[BCGIKS 20] Pseudorandom Correlation Functions (PCFs)

# Pseudorandom Correlation Functions

## Definition


# Pseudorandom Correlation Functions [BCGIKS20]

on-demand generation  
of  
correlated randomness




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
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on-demand generation  
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
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on-demand generation  
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
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on-demand generation  
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
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on-demand generation  
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
# Pseudorandom Correlation Functions [BCGIKS20]

**security:**  
*things look random  
up to correlation*




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
**security:**  
things look random  
up to correlation



# Pseudorandom Correlation Functions

[BCGIKS20]

**security:**  
things look random  
up to correlation



## Application

### Secure Computation

- party 1 has x
- party 2 has y
- Goal: compute  $f(x,y)$  without revealing x,y

[GMW87]

$|f|=n$  :

$O(n)$  OT correlations

||


send 4 bits/AND

# Pseudorandom Correlation Functions [BCGIKS20]

Our contribution:

Efficient\* Post-Quantum  
Public-Key PCF  
for  
OT Correlations


\* Efficiency  $\sim$  #OT per second




Public-Key

Pseudorandom Correlation Functions


# Pseudorandom Correlation Functions [BCGIKS20]



# Public-Key Pseudorandom Correlation Functions [BCMPR24]




# Public-Key Pseudorandom Correlation Functions [BCMPR24]



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Key Derivation




Evaluation




# Public-Key Pseudorandom Correlation Functions [BCMPR24]

Key Derivation



pp




Evaluation

# Public-Key Pseudorandom Correlation Functions [BCMPR24]


Key Derivation

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# Public-Key Pseudorandom Correlation Functions [BCMPR24]

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


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
Key Derivation

$\text{Gen}_0 \rightarrow (\text{sk}_0, \text{pk}_0)$

$\text{KeyDer}(\text{sk}_0, \text{pk}_1) \rightarrow k_0$



$\text{pp}$   
 $\text{pk}_0$   $\text{pk}_1$



$(\text{sk}_1, \text{pk}_1) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_1$


$k_1 \leftarrow \text{KeyDer}(\text{sk}_1, \text{pk}_0)$

Evaluation

# Public-Key Pseudorandom Correlation Functions [BCMPR24]

Key Derivation

Evaluation




# Public-Key Pseudorandom Correlation Functions [BCMPR24]

Key Derivation

security:

Evaluation



# Our Contributions

# Contributions

## Efficient Public-Key PCF for OT Correlations from Lattices

Secret-Power Ring  
Learning with Errors


# Contributions

## Efficient Public-Key PCF for OT Correlations from Lattices




# Contributions

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
# Contributions

## Efficient Public-Key PCF for OT Correlations from Lattices



# Contributions

## Efficient Public-Key PCF for OT Correlations from Lattices



# Contributions

## Efficient Public-Key PCF for OT Correlations from Lattices

In this talk



# Contributions

## Efficient Public-Key PCF for OT Correlations from Lattices

### In this talk



# Pseudorandom Functions

# Pseudorandom Functions (PRFs) [GGM86]

**Definition.** Deterministic keyed functions indistinguishable from truly random functions.

$$F : \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$$

Set of outputs **with** msk

010	11	101	1101	110	101	010	1
100111	10	0100	1001	1000	11	100	
11010	1010	1111	101011	010001			
1110010	10101000	1011	01001				
1000	11001	10101011	100101				
10110	101111	00000	10001	11			

Compute using msk  $\xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K}$  

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```
010 11 101 1101 110 101 010 1
 100111 10 0100 1001 1000 11 100
11010 1010 1111 101011 010001
 1110010 10101000 1011 01001
 1000 11001 10101011 100101
10110 101111 00000 10001 11
```

Compute using msk  $\xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K}$

Set of outputs **without** msk

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1110010	10101000	1011	01001				
1000	11001	10101011	100101				
10110	101111	00000	10001	11			

Compute using  $\text{msk} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K}$



Set of outputs **without** msk

11				010
			1001	
		1111		
			1011	
			11001	

with oracle queries on arbitrary / random inputs

**PRF** **weak PRF**

# Constrained Pseudorandom Functions

# Constrained Pseudorandom Functions (CPRFs) [BW13, KPTZ13, BGI14]

Pseudorandom Functions *with constrained access to the evaluation.*

Set of outputs **with** msk

```
010 11 101 1101 110 101 010 1  
100111 10 0100 1001 1000 11 100  
11010 1010 1111 101011 010001  
1110010 10101000 1011 01001  
1000 11001 10101011 100101  
10110 101111 00000 10001 11
```

Compute using msk  $\xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K}$  

Set of outputs **without** msk

```
11 010  
1001  
1111 1011  
11001
```

with oracle queries on arbitrary / random inputs

# Constrained Pseudorandom Functions (CPRFs) [BW13, KPTZ13, BGI14]

Pseudorandom Functions *with constrained access to the evaluation.*

Set of outputs **with** msk

010	11	101	1101	110	101	010	1
100111	10	0100	1001	1000	11	100	
11010	1010	1111	101011	010001			
1110010	10101000	1011	01001				
1000	11001	10101011	100101				
10110	101111	00000	10001	11			

ck 

For a subset  
 $S \subset \mathcal{X}$

Set of outputs **without** msk

11				010
			1001	
		1111		
			1011	
		11001		

Compute using msk  $\xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K}$  

with oracle queries on arbitrary / random inputs

# Constrained Pseudorandom Functions (CPRFs) BW13, KPTZ13, BGI14

Pseudorandom Functions *with constrained access to the evaluation.*

Set of outputs **with** msk

010	11	101	1101	110	101	010	1
100111	10	0100	1001	1000	11	100	
11010	1010	1111	101011	010001			
1110010	10101000	1011	01001				
1000	11001	10101011	100101				
10110	101111	00000	10001	11			

ck 

For a subset  
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Compute using msk  $\xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K}$  


11				010
			1001	
	1010	1111	101011	
1110010	10101000	1011		
	11001	10101011		

using ck 

local evaluation on  $S$

# Constrained Pseudorandom Functions (CPRFs) BW13, KPTZ13, BGI14

Pseudorandom Functions *with constrained access to the evaluation.*



# Constrained Pseudorandom Functions (CPRFs) BW13, KPTZ13, BGI14

Pseudorandom Functions *with constrained access to the evaluation.*

$\text{ck}_S$  “=” msk **only** for all  $x \in S$

Set of outputs **with** msk

010	11	101	1101	110	101	010	1
100111	10	0100	1001	1000	11	100	
11010	1010	1111	101011	010001			
1110010	10101000	1011	01001				
1000	11001	10101011	100101				
10110	101111	00000	10001	11			

$\text{ck}$    
For a subset  
 $S \subset \mathcal{X}$

Compute using msk  $\xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K}$  

11				010
			1001	
	1010	1111	101011	
1110010	10101000	1011		
	11001	10101011		

using  $\text{ck}$  

local evaluation on  $S$

# Constrained Pseudorandom Functions (CPRFs) [BW13, KPTZ13, BGI14]

Pseudorandom Functions *with constrained access to the evaluation.*

- Every predicate  $F : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$  defines a subset  $S_F = \{x \in \mathcal{X} : F(x) = 0\}$

Set of outputs **with** msk

010	11	101	1101	110	101	010	1
100111	10	0100	1001	1000	11	100	
11010	1010	1111	101011	010001			
1110010	10101000	1011	01001				
1000	11001	10101011	100101				
10110	101111	00000	10001	11			

Compute using msk  $\xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K}$  

11				010
			1001	
	1010	1111	101011	
1110010	10101000	1011		
	11001	10101011		

using  $\mathbf{ck}_F$  

local evaluation on  $S_F$

# Constrained Pseudorandom Functions (CPRFs)<sub>BW13, KPTZ13, BGI14</sub>

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$\overbrace{\hspace{10em}}$

(w)PRF  $\rightsquigarrow$  Pseudorandomly Constrained PRF

Set of outputs **with** msk

010	11	101	1101	110	101	010	1
100111	10	0100	1001	1000	11	100	
11010	1010	1111	101011	010001			
1110010	10101000	1011	01001				
1000	11001	10101011	100101				
10110	101111	00000	10001	11			

Compute using msk  $\xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K}$  

11				010
			1001	
	1010	1111	101011	
1110010	10101000	1011		
	11001	10101011		

using  $\mathbf{ck}_F$  

local evaluation on  $S_F$

# Pseudorandom Correlation Functions for Oblivious Transfer

from pseudorandomly constrained PRFs

# PCF for OT from Pseudorandomly Constrained PRFs

[BCMPR24]



# PCF for OT from Pseudorandomly Constrained PRFs [BCMPR24]




- wPRF  $F_k : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$

# PCF for OT from Pseudorandomly Constrained PRFs [BCMPR24]



- wPRF  $F_k : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$
- CPRF for  $F_k$  and  $\overline{F_k}$

# PCF for OT from Pseudorandomly Constrained PRFs [BCMPR24]



- wPRF  $F_k : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$

- CPRF for  $F_k$  and  $\overline{F_k}$


can generate a **ck** for either:

-any  $x$  s.t.  $F_k(x)=0$

or

-any  $x$  s.t.  $F_k(x)=1$

# PCF for OT from Pseudorandomly Constrained PRFs [BCMPR24]




$\text{KeyGen}(1^\lambda)$



- wPRF  $F_k : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$
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# PCF for OT from Pseudorandomly Constrained PRFs


[BCMPR24]



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
# PCF for OT from Pseudorandomly Constrained PRFs

[BCMPR24]




# PCF for OT from Pseudorandomly Constrained PRFs

[BCMPR24]




# PCF for OT from Pseudorandomly Constrained PRFs [BCMPR24]




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[BCMPR24]




# PCF for OT from Pseudorandomly Constrained PRFs

[BCMPR24]




# PCF for OT from Pseudorandomly Constrained PRFs

[BCMPR24]




# PCF for OT from Pseudorandomly Constrained PRFs

[BCMPR24]




# PCF for OT from Pseudorandomly Constrained PRFs

[BCMPR24]




# PCF for OT from Pseudorandomly Constrained PRFs

[BCMPR24]




# PCF for OT from Pseudorandomly Constrained PRFs

[BCMPR24]



# PCF for OT from Pseudorandomly Constrained PRFs


[BCMPR24]



# PCF for OT from Pseudorandomly Constrained PRFs

[BCMPR24]

OT-correlated ✓



- wPRF  $F_k : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$


- CPRF for  $F_k$  and  $\overline{F}_k$

# PCF for OT from Pseudorandomly Constrained PRFs

[BCMPR24]

OT-correlated ✓

## wPRF security




- wPRF  $F_k : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$

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# PCF for OT from Pseudorandomly Constrained PRFs

[BCMPR24]

OT-correlated ✓




- wPRF  $F_k : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$
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# PCF for OT from Pseudorandomly Constrained PRFs

[BCMPR24]

OT-correlated ✓

Secure ✓



- wPRF  $F_k : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$

- CPRF for  $F_k$  and  $\bar{F}_k$

CPRF security

,  $k$  (wPRF key)


# PCF for OT from Pseudorandomly Constrained PRFs

[BCMPR24]

OT-correlated ✓

Secure ✓

Precomputable




# PCF for OT from Pseudorandomly Constrained PRFs

[BCMPR24]

OT-correlated ✓

Secure ✓


Precomputable



# Contributions

## Efficient Public-Key PCF for OT Correlations from Lattices


In this talk



# Contributions

## Efficient Public-Key PCF for OT Correlations from Lattices

In this talk



A PRF  
from  
Ring LWE

# PRFs from Ring LWE

(Ring  $R_q$ )

- **Master Secret Key :**

$$\text{msk} := \left( (k_1, \dots, k_n) \xleftarrow{\$} R_q^n, s, a \xleftarrow{\$} R_q \right)$$

# PRFs from Ring LWE

$$P : \{0, 1\}^n \times R_q^n \rightarrow R_q$$

(Ring  $R_q$ )

- **Master Secret Key :**

$$\text{msk} := \left( (k_1, \dots, k_n) \xleftarrow{\$} R_q^n, s, a \xleftarrow{\$} R_q \right)$$

binary

- **Evaluation on**  $\vec{x} = \overbrace{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n}^{\text{binary}}$  :

$$F_{\text{msk}}(\vec{x}) := \lfloor as \cdot P(\vec{x}, \vec{k}) \rfloor_2$$

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$$F_{\text{msk}}(\vec{x}) := \lfloor as \cdot P(\vec{x}, \vec{k}) \rfloor_2 \quad (Y \in R_q : \lfloor Y \rfloor_2 = \lfloor Y \cdot (2/q) \rfloor)$$

# PRFs from Ring LWE

$P : \{0, 1\}^n \times R_q^n \rightarrow R_q$  (with range invertible in  $R_q$ )

(Ring  $R_q$ )

- Master Secret Key :

$\text{msk} := ((k_1, \dots, k_n) \xleftarrow{\$} R_q^n, s, a \xleftarrow{\$} R_q)$

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No-Evaluation Security

$as + e$  looks random

(Ring LWE)

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$P : \{0, 1\}^n \times R_q^n \rightarrow R_q$  (with range invertible in  $R_q$ )

(Ring  $R_q$ )

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$\text{msk} := ((k_1, \dots, k_n) \xleftarrow{\$} R_q^n, s, a \xleftarrow{\$} R_q)$

binary

- Evaluation on  $\vec{x} = \overbrace{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n}^{\text{binary}}$  :

$F_{\text{msk}}(\vec{x}) := \text{RO}(\lfloor as \cdot P(\vec{x}, \vec{k}) \rfloor_2)$

No-Evaluation Security

$as + e$  looks random

(Ring LWE)

Full security via Random Oracle

# A Constrained PRF from Secret-Power Ring LWE

# Constrained PRFs from Secret-Power Ring LWE

(Ring  $R_q$ )

- Master Secret Key :

$$\text{msk} := \left( (k_1, \dots, k_n) \xleftarrow{\$} R_q^n, \underbrace{s}_{\text{invertible}}, a \xleftarrow{\$} R_q \right)$$

- Evaluation on  $\vec{x} = \overbrace{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n}^{\text{binary}}$  :

$$F_{\text{msk}}(\vec{x}) := \lfloor as \cdot P(\vec{x}, \vec{k}/s) \rfloor_2$$

# Constrained PRFs from Secret-Power Ring LWE

Constraint:  $\mathsf{ck}_{\vec{z}}$  can evaluate on all  $\vec{x}$  iff  $P(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) = 0$   $(P : \{0, 1\}^n \times R_q^n \rightarrow R_q)$

(Ring  $R_q$ )

- Master Secret Key :

$$\mathsf{msk} := ((k_1, \dots, k_n) \xleftarrow{\$} R_q^n, \mathbf{s}, a \xleftarrow{\$} R_q)$$

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- Constrained Key for  $\vec{z} \in \{0, 1\}^n$  ?

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$$\text{Let } \vec{\ell} = \vec{k} - s \cdot \vec{z}$$

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Let  $\vec{\ell} = \vec{k} - s \cdot \vec{z}$

➡  $as \cdot P(\vec{x}, \vec{k}/s) = as \cdot P(\vec{x}, \vec{\ell}/s + \vec{z})$

# Constrained PRFs from Secret-Power Ring LWE

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(Ring  $R_q$ )

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$$P(\vec{x}, Y) = \sum_{i=0}^t p_i Y^i$$

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Let  $\vec{\ell} = \vec{k} - s \cdot \vec{z}$

$$\rightarrow as \cdot P(\vec{x}, \vec{k}/s) = as \cdot P(\vec{x}, \vec{\ell}/s + \vec{z})$$

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(Ring  $R_q$ )

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$\text{msk} := ((k_1, \dots, k_n) \xleftarrow{\$} R_q^n, \mathbf{s}, a \xleftarrow{\$} R_q)$   
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# Constrained PRFs from Secret-Power Ring LWE

Constraint:  $\text{ck}_{\vec{z}}$  can evaluate on all  $\vec{x}$  iff  $P(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) = 0$   $(P : \{0, 1\}^n \times R_q^n \rightarrow R_q)$

(Ring  $R_q$ )

- Master Secret Key :

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Let  $\vec{\ell} = \vec{k} - s \cdot \vec{z}$

$$\begin{aligned} \rightarrow as \cdot P(\vec{x}, \vec{k}/s) &= as \cdot P(\vec{x}, \vec{\ell}/s + \vec{z}) \\ &= as \cdot P(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) + as \cdot \frac{1}{s} Q(\vec{x}, \vec{z}, 1/s, \vec{\ell}) \end{aligned}$$

# Constrained PRFs from Secret-Power Ring LWE

Constraint:  $\text{ck}_{\vec{z}}$  can evaluate on all  $\vec{x}$  iff  $P(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) = 0$   $(P : \{0, 1\}^n \times R_q^n \rightarrow R_q)$

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# Constrained PRFs from Secret-Power Ring LWE

Constraint:  $\text{ck}_{\vec{z}}$  can evaluate on all  $\vec{x}$  iff  $P(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) = 0$   $(P : \{0, 1\}^n \times R_q^n \rightarrow R_q)$

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$$= as \cdot P(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) + a \cdot Q(\vec{x}, \vec{z}, 1/s, \vec{\ell})$$

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If  $P(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) = 0$

# Constrained PRFs from Secret-Power Ring LWE

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$$F_{\text{msk}}(\vec{x}) := \lfloor as \cdot P(\vec{x}, \vec{k}/s) \rfloor_2$$

is a polynomial  
in  $1/s$   
(rounded mod 2)  
when  $P(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) = 0$

$$P(\vec{x}, Y) = \sum_{i=0}^t p_i Y^i$$

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Let  $\vec{\ell} = \vec{k} - s \cdot \vec{z}$

$$\rightarrow as \cdot P(\vec{x}, \vec{k}/s) = as \cdot P(\vec{x}, \vec{\ell}/s + \vec{z})$$

$$= as \cdot P(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) + a \cdot Q(\vec{x}, \vec{z}, 1/s, \vec{\ell})$$

$$= as \cdot P(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) + \sum_{i=0}^t q_i \cdot a \left( \frac{1}{s} \right)^i$$

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# Constrained PRFs from Secret-Power Ring LWE

Constraint:  $\text{ck}_{\vec{z}}$  can evaluate on all  $\vec{x}$  iff  $P(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) = 0$   $(P : \{0, 1\}^n \times R_q^n \rightarrow R_q)$

(Ring  $R_q$ )

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$\text{msk} := ((k_1, \dots, k_n) \xleftarrow{\$} R_q^n, s, a \xleftarrow{\$} R_q)$   
binary

- Evaluation on  $\vec{x} = \overbrace{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n}^{\text{binary}}$  :

$F_{\text{msk}}(\vec{x}) := \lfloor as \cdot P(\vec{x}, \vec{k}/s) \rfloor_2$

is a polynomial  
in  $1/s$   
(rounded mod 2)  
when  $P(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) = 0$

$$P(\vec{x}, Y) = \sum_{i=0}^t p_i Y^i$$

- Constrained Key for  $\vec{z} \in \{0, 1\}^n$  ?

Let  $\vec{\ell} = \vec{k} - s \cdot \vec{z}$

$$\rightarrow as \cdot P(\vec{x}, \vec{k}/s) = as \cdot P(\vec{x}, \vec{\ell}/s + \vec{z})$$

$$= as \cdot P(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) + a \cdot Q(\vec{x}, \vec{z}, 1/s, \vec{\ell})$$

$$= as \cdot P(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) + \sum_{i=0}^t q_i \cdot a \left( \frac{1}{s} \right)^i$$

If  $P(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) = 0$

depends on  $\vec{x}, \vec{z}, \vec{\ell}$

# Constrained PRFs from Secret-Power Ring LWE

Constraint:  $\mathsf{ck}_{\vec{z}}$  can evaluate on all  $\vec{x}$  iff  $P(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) = 0$   $(P : \{0, 1\}^n \times R_q^n \rightarrow R_q)$

(Ring  $R_q$ )

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Let  $\vec{\ell} = \vec{k} - s \cdot \vec{z}$

$$\mathsf{ck}_{\vec{z}} := \left( \vec{\ell}, \left( \mathcal{A}_i = a \cdot (1/s)^i + e_i \right)_{i \in [0, t-1]}, \vec{z} \right)$$

# Constrained PRFs from Secret-Power Ring LWE

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- Constrained Evaluation :

- 1 Find  $c_i$ 's such that

$$P(\vec{x}, \vec{\ell}/S + \vec{z}) = P(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) + \sum_{i=1}^t c_i (1/S)^i$$

# Constrained PRFs from Secret-Power Ring LWE

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$P(\vec{x}, \vec{\ell}/S + \vec{z}) = P(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) + \sum_{i=1}^t c_i (1/S)^i$  *symbolic variable*

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- Constrained Evaluation :

- 1 Find  $c_i$ 's such that *symbolic variable*

$$P(\vec{x}, \vec{\ell}/S + \vec{z}) = P(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) + \sum_{i=1}^t c_i (1/S)^i$$

- 2 Output  $\lfloor \sum_{i=0}^{t-1} c_i \cdot \mathcal{A}_i \rfloor_2$

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binary

- Evaluation on  $\vec{x} = \overbrace{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n}^{\text{Evaluation on } \vec{x}}$  :

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Equal when  
 $P(\vec{x}, \vec{z})=0$

- Constrained Key for  $\vec{z} \in \{0, 1\}^n$

Let  $\vec{\ell} = \vec{k} - s \cdot \vec{z}$

$$\text{ck}_{\vec{z}} := \left( \vec{\ell}, \left( \mathcal{A}_i = a \cdot (1/s)^i + e_i \right)_{i \in [0, t-1]}, \vec{z} \right)$$

- Constrained Evaluation :

- Find  $c_i$ 's such that *symbolic variable*

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& error small

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No-Evaluation Security

$as + e$  looks random given  $(a \cdot (1/s)^i + e_i)_{i=0}^{t-1}$  (Secret-Power Ring LWE)

- Constrained Key for  $\vec{z} \in \{0, 1\}^n$  :

Let  $\vec{\ell} = \vec{k} - s \cdot \vec{z}$

$$\text{ck}_{\vec{z}} := \left( \vec{\ell}, \left( \mathcal{A}_i = a \cdot (1/s)^i + e_i \right)_{i \in [0, t-1]}, \vec{z} \right)$$

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- Evaluation on  $\vec{x} = \overbrace{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n}^{\text{binary}}$  :

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Full security via random oracle

# So What?

Our  $PK\text{-}PCF$  =  
Our CPRF from secret-power RLWE  
+ Goldreich-Applebaum-Raykov weak PRF ([Gol00, AR16])  
+ public-key setup à la succinct HSS ([ARP24])

Work	Post-Quantum	OT Variant	Key-Size	OT/sec
[OSY21]	✗	OT	small	1
[BCMPR24]	✗	OT	small	30k
[CDDKS24]	✓	List OT	5.5 MB	1.2M
This Work	✓	OT	567 MB	540-1k
	✓	OT	200 MB	190-450k

All works use random oracles

# Summary

## Efficient Public-Key PCF for OT Correlations from Lattices

Thank You!



# References

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- [BCGIKS19] E. Boyle, G. Couteau, N. Gilboa, Y. Ishai, L. Kohl, and P. Scholl. Efficient pseudorandom correlation generators: Silent OT extension and more.
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- [Gol00] O. Goldreich. Candidate one-way functions based on expander graphs.
- [KPTZ13] A. Kiayias, S. Papadopoulos, N. Triandopoulos, and T. Zacharias. Delegatable pseudorandom functions and applications.

GAR wPRF  
as

a constraint

**GAR weak PRF**

$$\vec{z} \in \{0,1\}^n, \vec{x} \in \{0,1\}^{\kappa+\tau}$$

$$F(\vec{z}, \vec{x}) = \text{XOR}_\kappa\text{-MAJ}_\tau(\vec{z}[x_1], \dots, \vec{z}[x_{\kappa+\tau}]) \in \{0,1\}$$

where

$$\text{XOR}_\kappa\text{-MAJ}_\tau(b_1, \dots, b_{\kappa+\tau}) = \text{XOR}_\kappa(b_1, \dots, b_\kappa) \oplus \text{MAJ}(b_{\kappa+1}, \dots, b_{\kappa+\tau})$$

**GAR weak PRF**

$$\vec{z} \in \{0,1\}^n, \vec{x} \in \{0,1\}^{\kappa+\tau}$$

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where

$$\text{XOR}_\kappa\text{-MAJ}_\tau(b_1, \dots, b_{\kappa+\tau}) = \text{XOR}_\kappa(b_1, \dots, b_\kappa) \oplus \text{MAJ}(b_{\kappa+1}, \dots, b_{\kappa+\tau})$$

We find two polynomials  $P$  and  $\bar{P}$  over  $R_q$  such that

$$P_{\kappa, \tau}(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) = 0 \iff F(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) = 0$$

$$\bar{P}_{\kappa, \tau}(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) = 0 \iff F(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) = 1$$

*Degree  $O(\kappa+\tau)$*