

Post-Quantum Public-Key Pseudorandom Correlation Functions for OT

Shweta Agrawal¹, Kaartik Bhushan², Geoffroy Couteau², and
Mahshid Riahinia³


¹ IIT Madras, India.

² Université Paris Cité, CNRS, IRIF, Paris, France.



³ ENS, CNRS, visitor at IRIF, Paris, France.

Introduction: Correlated Randomness



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


2PC: 2-Party Computation


Introduction: Correlated Randomness

Secure Computation

- party 1 has x
- party 2 has y
- Goal: compute $f(x,y)$ without revealing x,y




Symmetric Encryption



Oblivious Transfer (OT) Correlation

2PC: 2-Party Computation

Introduction: Correlated Randomness




Symmetric Encryption

Secure Communication

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Oblivious Transfer (OT) Correlation


Secure Computation

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
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Symmetric Encryption

Secure Communication




Oblivious Transfer (OT) Correlation

Fast & Info-Theoretic Secure Computation

2PC: 2-Party Computation

Introduction: Correlated Randomness




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


Oblivious Transfer (OT) Correlation


Fast & Info-Theoretic Secure Computation

f has n gates : $O(n)$ OT pairs \rightarrow send 4 bits per AND


Introduction: Correlated Randomness



Can we generate
correlated randomness
on demand?




Introduction: Correlated Randomness



Symmetric Encryption


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Oblivious Transfer (OT) Correlation


[BCGIKS 19] Pseudorandom Correlation Generators (PCGs)
[BCGIKS 20] Pseudorandom Correlation Functions (PCFs)

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correlated randomness
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Oblivious Transfer (OT) Correlation

[BCGIKS 19] Pseudorandom Correlation Generators (PCGs)



[BCGIKS 20] Pseudorandom Correlation Functions (PCFs)

Pseudorandom Correlation Functions


Definition

Pseudorandom Correlation Functions [BCGKS20]


on-demand generation
of
correlated randomness




on-demand generation
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


on-demand generation
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
Pseudorandom Correlation Functions [BCGIKS20]

on-demand generation
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
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on-demand generation
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
Pseudorandom Correlation Functions [BCGIKS20]

security:
*things look random
up to correlation*




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


Pseudorandom Correlation Functions [BCGIKS20]

security:
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security:
things look random
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Application

Secure Computation

- party 1 has x
- party 2 has y
- Goal: compute $f(x,y)$ without revealing x,y

[GMW87]

$|f|=n$:

$O(n)$ OT correlations


\Downarrow

send 4 bits/AND

Our contribution:

Efficient* Post-Quantum
Public-Key PCF
for
OT Correlations

* Efficiency \sim #OT per second




Public-Key




Pseudorandom Correlation Functions

Pseudorandom Correlation Functions [BCGIKS20]





Public-Key Pseudorandom Correlation Functions [BCMPR24]




Public-Key PCF:
Derive keys publicly

Public-Key Pseudorandom Correlation Functions [BCMPR24]




Public-Key Pseudorandom Correlation Functions [BCMPR24]

Key Derivation




Evaluation




Public-Key Pseudorandom Correlation Functions [BCMPR24]

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


pp



Public-Key Pseudorandom Correlation Functions [BCMPR24]


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Key Derivation




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
Public-Key Pseudorandom Correlation Functions [BCMPR24]

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
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


Our Contributions


Efficient Public-Key PCF for OT Correlations from Lattices

Secret-Power Ring
Learning with Errors

Efficient Public-Key PCF for OT Correlations from Lattices




Efficient Public-Key PCF for OT Correlations from Lattices




Contributions

Efficient Public-Key PCF for OT Correlations from Lattices



Contributions

Efficient Public-Key PCF for OT Correlations from Lattices



HSS: Homomorphic Secret Sharing


Efficient Public-Key PCF for OT Correlations from Lattices

In this talk



Efficient Public-Key PCF for OT Correlations from Lattices

In this talk



Pseudorandom Functions

Pseudorandom Functions (PRFs) [GGM86]

Definition. Deterministic keyed functions indistinguishable from truly random functions.

$$F : \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$$

Set of outputs **with** msk

```
010 11 101 1101 110 101 010 1
100111 10 0100 1001 1000 11 100
11010 1010 1111 101011 010001
1110010 10101000 1011 01001
1000 11001 10101011 100101
10110 101111 00000 10001 11
```

Compute using msk $\stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{K}$ 

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```

Compute using msk $\xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K}$ 

Set of outputs **without** msk

```
11 010
1001
1111
1011
11001
```

with oracle queries on arbitrary / random inputs

PRF **weak PRF**

Constrained Pseudorandom Functions

Constrained Pseudorandom Functions (CPRFs)_[BW13,KPTZ13,BGI14]

Pseudorandom Functions *with constrained access to the evaluation.*

Set of outputs **with** msk

```
010 11 101 1101 110 101 010 1
100111 10 0100 1001 1000 11 100
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```

Compute using msk $\xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K}$ 

ck 
For a subset
 $S \subset \mathcal{X}$

Set of outputs **without** msk

```
11 1001 010
1111
1011
11001
```

with oracle queries on arbitrary / random inputs


Constrained Pseudorandom Functions (CPRFs)_[BW13,KPTZ13,BGI14]

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Set of outputs *with* msk

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```

Compute using msk $\xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K}$ 

ck 
For a subset
 $S \subset \mathcal{X}$

```
11 010
1001
1010 1111 101011
1110010 10101000 1011
11001 10101011
```

using ck 

local evaluation on S


Constrained Pseudorandom Functions (CPRFs)_[BW13,KPTZ13,BGI14]

Pseudorandom Functions *with constrained access to the evaluation.*

Set of outputs **with** msk

```
010 11 101 1101 110 101 010 1
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1110010 10101000 1011 01001
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```

Compute using msk $\xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K}$ 

ck 
For a subset
 $S \subset \mathcal{X}$

oracle queries

```
11 010
1010 1111 101011
1110010 10101000 1011
11001 10101011
```

using ck 

local evaluation on S

Constrained Pseudorandom Functions (CPRFs)_[BW13,KPTZ13,BGI14]


Pseudorandom Functions *with constrained access to the evaluation.*

$ck_S =$ msk *only* for all $x \in S$

Set of outputs *with* msk

```
010 11 101 1101 110 101 010 1
100111 10 0100 1001 1000 11 100
11010 1010 1111 101011 010001
1110010 10101000 1011 01001
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```

Compute using msk $\xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K}$ 

ck 
For a subset
 $S \subset \mathcal{X}$

```
11 010
1001
1010 1111 101011
1110010 10101000 1011
11001 10101011
```

using ck 

local evaluation on S

Constrained Pseudorandom Functions (CPRFs)_[BW13,KPTZ13,BGI14]

Pseudorandom Functions *with constrained access to the evaluation.*

✦ Every predicate $F : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ defines a subset $S_F = \{x \in \mathcal{X} : F(x) = 0\}$

Set of outputs **with** msk

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1110010 10101000 1011 01001
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```

Compute using msk $\xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K}$ 

```
11 010
1001
1010 1111 101011
1110010 10101000 1011
11001 10101011
```

using ck_F 

local evaluation on S_F

Constrained Pseudorandom Functions (CPRFs)_[BW13,KPTZ13,BGI14]

Pseudorandom Functions *with constrained access to the evaluation.*

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(w)PRF \rightsquigarrow Pseudorandomly Constrained PRF

Set of outputs **with** msk

```
010 11 101 1101 110 101 010 1
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11010 1010 1111 101011 010001
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```

Compute using msk $\xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K}$ 


```
11 010
1001
1010 1111 101011
1110010 10101000 1011
11001 10101011
```

using ck_F 


local evaluation on S_F

Pseudorandom Correlation Functions for Oblivious Transfer



from pseudorandomly constrained PRFs





- wPRF $F_k : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$



- wPRF $F_k : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$
- CPRF for F_k and $\overline{F_k}$





- wPRF $F_k : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$


- CPRF for F_k and $\overline{F_k}$

can generate a **ck** for either:

-any x s.t. $F_k(x)=0$

or


-any x s.t. $F_k(x)=1$



$\text{KeyGen}(1^\lambda)$




- wPRF $F_k : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$
- CPRF for F_k and $\overline{F_k}$




PCF for OT from Pseudorandomly Constrained PRFs


[BCM⁺PR24]




PCF for OT from Pseudorandomly Constrained PRFs

[BCMPR24]









PCF for OT from Pseudorandomly Constrained PRFs

[BCMPR24]




PCF for OT from Pseudorandomly Constrained PRFs

[BCMPR24]




PCF for OT from Pseudorandomly Constrained PRFs

[BCMPR24]




PCF for OT from Pseudorandomly Constrained PRFs

[BCMPR24]




PCF for OT from Pseudorandomly Constrained PRFs

[BCMPR24]




PCF for OT from Pseudorandomly Constrained PRFs

[BCMPR24]



PCF for OT from Pseudorandomly Constrained PRFs


[BCMPR24]



PCF for OT from Pseudorandomly Constrained PRFs

[BCMPR24]


OT-correlated ✓



PCF for OT from Pseudorandomly Constrained PRFs

[BCMPR24]


OT-correlated ✓



PCF for OT from Pseudorandomly Constrained PRFs

[BCMPR24]

OT-correlated ✓




PCF for OT from Pseudorandomly Constrained PRFs

[BCMPR24]

OT-correlated ✓

Secure ✓




PCF for OT from Pseudorandomly Constrained PRFs

[BCMPR24]

OT-correlated ✓

Secure ✓

Precomputable




PCF for OT from Pseudorandomly Constrained PRFs

[BCMPR24]

OT-correlated ✓

Secure ✓

Precomputable




Efficient Public-Key PCF for OT Correlations from Lattices

In this talk



Efficient Public-Key PCF for OT Correlations from Lattices

In this talk



**A PRF
from
Ring LWE**

PRFs from Ring LWE

(Ring R_q)

- Master Secret Key :

$$\text{msk} := ((k_1, \dots, k_n) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} R_q^n, s, a \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} R_q)$$

PRFs from Ring LWE

$$P : \{0, 1\}^n \times R_q^n \rightarrow R_q$$

(Ring R_q)

- **Master Secret Key :**

$$\text{msk} := ((k_1, \dots, k_n) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} R_q^n, s, a \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} R_q)$$

- **Evaluation on $\vec{x} = \overbrace{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n}^{\text{binary}}$:**

$$F_{\text{msk}}(\vec{x}) := \lfloor as \cdot P(\vec{x}, \vec{k}) \rfloor_2$$

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$$F_{\text{msk}}(\vec{x}) := \lfloor as \cdot P(\vec{x}, \vec{k}) \rfloor_2$$

$$(Y \in R_q : \lfloor Y \rfloor_2 = \lfloor Y \cdot (2/q) \rfloor)$$

PRFs from Ring LWE

$$P : \{0, 1\}^n \times R_q^n \rightarrow R_q \quad (\text{with range invertible in } R_q)$$

(Ring R_q)

- **Master Secret Key :**

$$\text{msk} := ((k_1, \dots, k_n) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} R_q^n, s, a \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} R_q)$$

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No-Evaluation Security

$as + e$ looks random

(Ring LWE)

PRFs from Ring LWE

$$P : \{0, 1\}^n \times R_q^n \rightarrow R_q \quad (\text{with range invertible in } R_q)$$

(Ring R_q)

- **Master Secret Key :**

$$\text{msk} := ((k_1, \dots, k_n) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} R_q^n, s, a \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} R_q)$$

- **Evaluation on** $\vec{x} = \overbrace{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n}^{\text{binary}}$:

$$F_{\text{msk}}(\vec{x}) := \text{RO}(\lfloor as \cdot P(\vec{x}, \vec{k}) \rfloor_2)$$

No-Evaluation Security

$as + e$ looks random
(Ring LWE)

Full security via Random Oracle

A Constrained PRF
from
Secret-Power Ring **LWE**

Constrained PRFs from Secret-Power Ring LWE

(Ring R_q)

- Master Secret Key :

$$\text{msk} := ((k_1, \dots, k_n) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} R_q^n, \overset{\text{invertible}}{\underset{\curvearrowright}{s}}, a \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} R_q)$$

- Evaluation on $\vec{x} = \overbrace{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n}^{\text{binary}}$:

$$F_{\text{msk}}(\vec{x}) := \lfloor as \cdot P(\vec{x}, \vec{k}/s) \rfloor_2$$

Constrained PRFs from Secret-Power Ring LWE

Constraint: $\text{ck}_{\vec{z}}$ can evaluate on all \vec{x} iff $P(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) = 0$

$$(P : \{0, 1\}^n \times R_q^n \rightarrow R_q)$$

(Ring R_q)

- Master Secret Key:

$$\text{msk} := ((k_1, \dots, k_n) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} R_q^n, \textcolor{blue}{s}, a \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} R_q)$$

- Evaluation on $\vec{x} = \overbrace{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n}^{\text{binary}}$:

$$F_{\text{msk}}(\vec{x}) := \lfloor as \cdot P(\vec{x}, \vec{k}/s) \rfloor_2$$

- Constrained Key for $\vec{z} \in \{0, 1\}^n$?

Constrained PRFs from Secret-Power Ring LWE

Constraint: $\text{ck}_{\vec{z}}$ can evaluate on all \vec{x} iff $P(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) = 0$

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- Master Secret Key:

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$$\text{Let } \vec{\ell} = \vec{k} - s \cdot \vec{z}$$

Constrained PRFs from Secret-Power Ring LWE

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- **Master Secret Key :**

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- **Evaluation on $\vec{x} = \overbrace{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n}^{\text{binary}}$:**

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- **Constrained Key for $\vec{z} \in \{0, 1\}^n$?**

$$\text{Let } \vec{\ell} = \vec{k} - s \cdot \vec{z}$$

$$\Rightarrow as \cdot P(\vec{x}, \vec{k}/s) = as \cdot P(\vec{x}, \vec{\ell}/s + \vec{z})$$

Constrained PRFs from Secret-Power Ring LWE

Constraint: $\text{ck}_{\vec{z}}$ can evaluate on all \vec{x} iff $P(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) = 0$

$$(P : \{0, 1\}^n \times R_q^n \rightarrow R_q)$$

(Ring R_q)

$$P(\vec{x}, Y) = \sum_{i=0}^t p_i Y^i$$

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$$\text{msk} := ((k_1, \dots, k_n) \xleftarrow{\$} R_q^n, \textcolor{blue}{s}, a \xleftarrow{\$} R_q)$$

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$$\text{Let } \vec{\ell} = \vec{k} - s \cdot \vec{z}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \Rightarrow as \cdot P(\vec{x}, \vec{k}/s) &= as \cdot P(\vec{x}, \vec{\ell}/s + \vec{z}) \\ &= as \cdot \sum_{i=0}^t p_i (\vec{\ell}/s + \vec{z})^i \end{aligned}$$

Constrained PRFs from Secret-Power Ring LWE

Constraint: $\text{ck}_{\vec{z}}$ can evaluate on all \vec{x} iff $P(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) = 0$

$$(P : \{0, 1\}^n \times R_q^n \rightarrow R_q)$$

(Ring R_q)

$$P(\vec{x}, Y) = \sum_{i=0}^t p_i Y^i$$

- Master Secret Key:

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- Evaluation on $\vec{x} = \overbrace{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n}^{\text{binary}}$:

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- Constrained Key for $\vec{z} \in \{0, 1\}^n$?

$$\text{Let } \vec{\ell} = \vec{k} - s \cdot \vec{z}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \Rightarrow as \cdot P(\vec{x}, \vec{k}/s) &= as \cdot P(\vec{x}, \vec{\ell}/s + \vec{z}) \\ &= as \cdot \sum_{i=0}^t p_i \left(\vec{\ell}/s + \vec{z} \right)^i \\ &= as \cdot P(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) + as \cdot \frac{1}{s}(\dots) \end{aligned}$$

Constrained PRFs from Secret-Power Ring LWE

Constraint: $\text{ck}_{\vec{z}}$ can evaluate on all \vec{x} iff $P(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) = 0$

$$(P : \{0, 1\}^n \times R_q^n \rightarrow R_q)$$

(Ring R_q)

$$P(\vec{x}, Y) = \sum_{i=0}^t p_i Y^i$$

- Master Secret Key:

$$\text{msk} := ((k_1, \dots, k_n) \xleftarrow{\$} R_q^n, \textcolor{blue}{s}, a \xleftarrow{\$} R_q)$$

- Evaluation on $\vec{x} = \overbrace{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n}^{\text{binary}}$:

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$$\text{Let } \vec{\ell} = \vec{k} - s \cdot \vec{z}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \Rightarrow as \cdot P(\vec{x}, \vec{k}/s) &= as \cdot P(\vec{x}, \vec{\ell}/s + \vec{z}) \\ &= as \cdot P(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) + as \cdot \frac{1}{s} Q(\vec{x}, \vec{z}, 1/s, \vec{\ell}) \end{aligned}$$

Constrained PRFs from Secret-Power Ring LWE

Constraint: $\text{ck}_{\vec{z}}$ can evaluate on all \vec{x} iff $P(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) = 0$

$(P : \{0, 1\}^n \times R_q^n \rightarrow R_q)$

(Ring R_q)

$$P(\vec{x}, Y) = \sum_{i=0}^t p_i Y^i$$

- Master Secret Key:

$$\text{msk} := ((k_1, \dots, k_n) \xleftarrow{\$} R_q^n, \textcolor{blue}{s}, a \xleftarrow{\$} R_q)$$

- Evaluation on $\vec{x} = \overbrace{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n}^{\text{binary}}$:

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Constrained PRFs from Secret-Power Ring LWE

Constraint: $\text{ck}_{\vec{z}}$ can evaluate on all \vec{x} iff $P(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) = 0$

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$$\text{Let } \vec{\ell} = \vec{k} - s \cdot \vec{z}$$

$$\Rightarrow as \cdot P(\vec{x}, \vec{k}/s) = as \cdot P(\vec{x}, \vec{\ell}/s + \vec{z})$$

$$= as \cdot P(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) + a \cdot Q(\vec{x}, \vec{z}, 1/s, \vec{\ell})$$

$$= as \cdot P(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) + \sum_{i=0}^t q_i \cdot a \left(\frac{1}{s} \right)^i$$

Constrained PRFs from Secret-Power Ring LWE

Constraint: $\text{ck}_{\vec{z}}$ can evaluate on all \vec{x} iff $P(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) = 0$

$$(P : \{0, 1\}^n \times R_q^n \rightarrow R_q)$$

(Ring R_q)

$$P(\vec{x}, Y) = \sum_{i=0}^t p_i Y^i$$

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$$\text{msk} := ((k_1, \dots, k_n) \xleftarrow{\$} R_q^n, \textcolor{blue}{s}, a \xleftarrow{\$} R_q)$$

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$$= as \cdot P(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) + a \cdot Q(\vec{x}, \vec{z}, 1/s, \vec{\ell})$$

$$= \cancel{as \cdot P(\vec{x}, \vec{z})} + \sum_{i=0}^t q_i \cdot a \left(\frac{1}{s}\right)^i$$

$$\text{If } P(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) = 0$$

Constrained PRFs from Secret-Power Ring LWE

Constraint: $\text{ck}_{\vec{z}}$ can evaluate on all \vec{x} iff $P(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) = 0$

$$(P : \{0, 1\}^n \times R_q^n \rightarrow R_q)$$

(Ring R_q)

$$P(\vec{x}, Y) = \sum_{i=0}^t p_i Y^i$$

Master Secret Key:

$$\text{msk} := ((k_1, \dots, k_n) \xleftarrow{\$} R_q^n, \textcolor{blue}{s}, a \xleftarrow{\$} R_q)$$

Evaluation on $\vec{x} = \overbrace{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n}^{\text{binary}}$:

$$F_{\text{msk}}(\vec{x}) := \lfloor as \cdot P(\vec{x}, \vec{k}/s) \rfloor_2$$

is a polynomial
in $1/s$
(rounded mod 2)
when $P(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) = 0$

Constrained Key for $\vec{z} \in \{0, 1\}^n$?

$$\text{Let } \vec{\ell} = \vec{k} - s \cdot \vec{z}$$

$$\Rightarrow as \cdot P(\vec{x}, \vec{k}/s) = as \cdot P(\vec{x}, \vec{\ell}/s + \vec{z})$$

$$= as \cdot P(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) + a \cdot Q(\vec{x}, \vec{z}, 1/s, \vec{\ell})$$

$$= as \cdot P(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) + \sum_{i=0}^t q_i \cdot a \left(\frac{1}{s}\right)^i$$

$$\text{If } P(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) = 0$$

Constrained PRFs from Secret-Power Ring LWE

Constraint: $\text{ck}_{\vec{z}}$ can evaluate on all \vec{x} iff $P(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) = 0$

$$(P : \{0, 1\}^n \times R_q^n \rightarrow R_q)$$

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$$P(\vec{x}, Y) = \sum_{i=0}^t p_i Y^i$$

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$$\text{msk} := ((k_1, \dots, k_n) \xleftarrow{\$} R_q^n, \textcolor{blue}{s}, a \xleftarrow{\$} R_q)$$

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$$\text{Let } \vec{\ell} = \vec{k} - s \cdot \vec{z}$$

$$\Rightarrow as \cdot P(\vec{x}, \vec{k}/s) = as \cdot P(\vec{x}, \vec{\ell}/s + \vec{z})$$

$$= as \cdot P(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) + a \cdot Q(\vec{x}, \vec{z}, 1/s, \vec{\ell})$$

$$= as \cdot P(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) + \sum_{i=0}^t \textcolor{pink}{q_i} \cdot a \left(\frac{1}{s}\right)^i$$

$$\text{If } P(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) = 0$$

depends on $\vec{x}, \vec{z}, \vec{\ell}$

Constrained PRFs from Secret-Power Ring LWE

Constraint: $\text{ck}_{\vec{z}}$ can evaluate on all \vec{x} iff $P(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) = 0$

$$(P : \{0, 1\}^n \times R_q^n \rightarrow R_q)$$

(Ring R_q)

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$$\text{msk} := ((k_1, \dots, k_n) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} R_q^n, \textcolor{blue}{s}, a \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} R_q)$$

- Evaluation on $\vec{x} = \overbrace{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n}^{\text{binary}}$:

$$F_{\text{msk}}(\vec{x}) := \lfloor as \cdot P(\vec{x}, \vec{k}/s) \rfloor_2$$

- Constrained Key for $\vec{z} \in \{0, 1\}^n$:

$$\text{Let } \vec{\ell} = \vec{k} - s \cdot \vec{z}$$

Constrained PRFs from Secret-Power Ring LWE

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$$F_{\text{msk}}(\vec{x}) := \lfloor as \cdot P(\vec{x}, \vec{k}/s) \rfloor_2$$

- Constrained Key for $\vec{z} \in \{0, 1\}^n$:

$$\text{Let } \vec{\ell} = \vec{k} - s \cdot \vec{z}$$

$$\text{ck}_{\vec{z}} := \left(\vec{\ell}, \left(\mathcal{A}_i = a \cdot (1/s)^i + e_i \right)_{i \in [0, t-1]}, \vec{z} \right)$$

Constrained PRFs from Secret-Power Ring LWE

Constraint: $\text{ck}_{\vec{z}}$ can evaluate on all \vec{x} iff $P(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) = 0$

$$(P : \{0, 1\}^n \times R_q^n \rightarrow R_q)$$

(Ring R_q)

- Master Secret Key:

$$\text{msk} := ((k_1, \dots, k_n) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} R_q^n, \textcolor{blue}{s}, a \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} R_q)$$

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- Constrained Evaluation:

- 1 Find c_i 's such that

$$P(\vec{x}, \vec{\ell}/S + \vec{z}) = P(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) + \sum_{i=1}^t c_i (1/S)^i$$

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- Constrained Evaluation:

1 Find c_i 's such that

$$P(\vec{x}, \vec{\ell}/\textcolor{teal}{S} + \vec{z}) = P(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) + \sum_{i=1}^t c_i (1/\textcolor{teal}{S})^i$$

symbolic variable

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symbolic variable

2 Output $\lfloor \sum_{i=0}^{t-1} c_i \cdot \mathcal{A}_i \rfloor_2$

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Equal when
 $P(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) = 0$

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 $P(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) = 0$
& error small

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symbolic variable

- Output $\lfloor \sum_{i=0}^{t-1} c_i \cdot \mathcal{A}_i \rfloor_2$

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$$F_{\text{msk}}(\vec{x}) := \lfloor as \cdot P(\vec{x}, \vec{k}/s) \rfloor_2$$

Equal when $P(x, z) = 0$
& error small

- Constrained Key for $\vec{z} \in \{0, 1\}^n$:

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$$\text{ck}_{\vec{z}} := \left(\vec{\ell}, \left(\mathcal{A}_i = a \cdot (1/s)^i + e_i \right)_{i \in [0, t-1]}, \vec{z} \right)$$

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1 Find c_i 's such that

$$P(\vec{x}, \vec{\ell}/\overset{\text{symbolic variable}}{S} + \vec{z}) = P(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) + \sum_{i=1}^t c_i (1/\overset{\text{symbolic variable}}{S})^i$$

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No-Evaluation Security

$as + e$ looks random given $(a \cdot (1/s)^i + e_i)_i$
(Secret-Power Ring LWE)

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- Output $\lfloor \sum_{i=0}^{t-1} c_i \cdot \mathcal{A}_i \rfloor_2$

Full security via random oracle

So What?

*Our PK-PCF =
Our CPRF from secret-power RLWE
+ Goldreich-Applebaum-Raykov weak PRF ([Gol00,AR16])
+ public-key setup à la succinct HSS ([ARP24])*


Work	Post-Quantum	OT Variant	Key-Size	OT/sec
[OSY21]	✗	OT	small	1
[BCMPR24]	✗	OT	small	30k
[CDDKS24]	✓	List OT	5.5 MB	1.2M
This Work	✓	OT	567 MB	540-1k
	✓	OT	200 MB	190-450k

All works use random oracles

Summary

Efficient Public-Key PCF for OT Correlations from Lattices

Thank You!



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GAR wPRF
as
a constraint

GAR weak PRF

$$\vec{z} \in \{0, 1\}^n, \vec{x} \in \{0, 1\}^{\kappa+\tau}$$

$$F(\vec{z}, \vec{x}) = \text{XOR}_{\kappa}\text{-MAJ}_{\tau}(\vec{z}[x_1], \dots, \vec{z}[x_{\kappa+\tau}]) \in \{0, 1\}$$

where

$$\text{XOR}_{\kappa}\text{-MAJ}_{\tau}(b_1, \dots, b_{\kappa+\tau}) = \text{XOR}_{\kappa}(b_1, \dots, b_{\kappa}) \oplus \text{MAJ}(b_{\kappa+1}, \dots, b_{\kappa+\tau})$$

GAR weak PRF

$$\vec{z} \in \{0, 1\}^n, \vec{x} \in \{0, 1\}^{\kappa+\tau}$$

$$F(\vec{z}, \vec{x}) = \text{XOR}_{\kappa}\text{-MAJ}_{\tau}(\vec{z}[x_1], \dots, \vec{z}[x_{\kappa+\tau}]) \in \{0, 1\}$$

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We find two polynomials P and \overline{P} over R_q such that

$$P_{\kappa, \tau}(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) = 0 \iff F(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) = 0$$

$$\overline{P}_{\kappa, \tau}(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) = 0 \iff F(\vec{x}, \vec{z}) = 1$$

Degree $O(\kappa+\tau)$