
Variations on the Knapsack Generator

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Université Picardie - École d'ingénieurs Jules Verne

May 16th, at Rennes





GENERATOR

KNAPSACK

Generator

Pseudo Random Number

KNAPSACK GENERATOR

Hard computational Pseudo Random Number problem Generator

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1 Definitions:

2 First attack against the Knapsack Generator

3 New attack against the Knapsack Generator

PRNG



PRNG



- Security is often based on perfect randomness
- "True" randomness is expensive

PRNG



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- "True" randomness is expensive

- Shared randomness is common in cryptography
- Stream cipher
- Reducing communication in MPC protocols.

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• The flow is not indistinguishable from true randomness

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
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- Even worse, we can retrieve the seed from a reasonable number of outputs.


A PRNG is weak if:

- The flow is not indistinguishable from true randomness
- Worse, further outputs are predictable
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(almost) Knapsack Problem







Subset Sum Problem

Mathematic version

```
\boldsymbol{\omega} = (\omega_1, \dots, \omega_n) \in \{0, N\}^n
The weight list:
                                        \mathbf{u} = (u_1, \dots, u_n) \in \{0, 1\}^n
The secret composition:
```

 $v = \sum \omega_i u_i = \langle \boldsymbol{\omega}, \mathbf{u} \rangle$ The target weight:


Subset Sum Problem


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
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
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
The Subset Sum Problem is NP-hard and remain hard if we replace v by $v \mod N$ as long as $N \simeq 2^n$.












¹Rueppel, R.A., Massey, J.L.: Knapsack as a nonlinear function. In: IEEE Intern. Symp. of Inform. Theory, vol. 46 (1985)



We call δ_i the truncated bits : $v_i = 2^{\ell} s_i + \delta_i$.

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
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secret : u + ω


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
n bits n^2 bits



n bits n^2 bits

32 bits 1024 bits





Can we distinguish between the u ? Yes, with $\ensuremath{\mathsf{OMEGARETRIEVER}}$

Distinguish between u

We consider m outputs and $\mathbf{s} = (s_1, \dots, s_m)$.

OmegaRetriever: $\mathbf{u}, \mathbf{s} \to \pmb{\omega}'$ close to $\pmb{\omega}$ $\mathbf{u}', \mathbf{s} \to \pmb{\omega}''$ not close to $\pmb{\omega}$

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KnapsackGen (u, ω') will be close to KnapsackGen (u, ω) . KnapsackGen (u', ω'') will be not.

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$$\mathbf{u} \stackrel{wPRNG}{\longrightarrow} u_1, \dots, u_m$$

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We construct T such that :

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$$TU = Id \mod 2^n$$
 (polynomial)

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OmegaRetriever from FSE 2011 (part 2)

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
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
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
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Experimental results are close to the bound.










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But ω' defined as $U \times \omega' \equiv \mathbf{v}' \bmod 2^n$ is close to $\omega!$

Why does it work?

- $\mathbf{v} \mathbf{v}'$ is small and equal to $U \times (\boldsymbol{\omega} \boldsymbol{\omega}') \bmod 2^n$
- U small because in $\mathcal{M}(\{0,1\})$

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
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- $\omega \omega' = T \times (\mathbf{v} \mathbf{v}') \bmod 2^n$
- We can bound T and $(\mathbf{v} \mathbf{v}')$


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- $\omega \omega' = T \times (\mathbf{v} \mathbf{v}') \mod 2^n$
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- BUT $\|\omega \omega'\| \ll \|T\| \times \|(\mathbf{v} \mathbf{v}')\|$


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
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
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We denote A_K the set of red points

$$|A_K| = (2 \times \lfloor K/\|U\|\rfloor - 1)^n$$

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


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
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We denote B_K the set of points in the ball


How many point in B_K ?



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
How many point in B_K ?



Gaussian Heuristic : $|B_K| \simeq Volume(Ball)/Volume(\Lambda)$

In the case where n=32, m=42 and $\ell \leq 15$,

$$|A_K| \ge |B_K|$$
 with $K = 2^{\ell+1}$



Thus $\mathbf{v} - \mathbf{v}'$ is a red point and $\|\boldsymbol{\omega} - \boldsymbol{\omega}'\| < K/\|U\|$.

Experimental results

ℓ	5		10		15		20		25	
m	34	40	34	40	34	40	35	40	39	40
√bits (over 32)	27	28	22	23	5	18	4	13	6	8

Figure: Quality of $\boldsymbol{\omega'}$ for n=32

ℓ	5		10		15		20
\overline{m}	34	40	35	40	36	40	41
√ bits (over 32)	10	22	10	17	8	12	6

Figure: Quality of $\pmb{\omega'}$ for n=32 for FSE 2011 algorithm

Thank you for your attention,