Table of contents

Description

  • Speaker

    Jinwei Zheng - Télécom Paris

The Module Learning With Errors (MLWE) problem is the fundamental hardness assumption underlying the key encapsulation and signature schemes ML-KEM and ML-DSA, which have been selected by NIST for post-quantum cryptography standardization. Understanding its quantum hardness is crucial for assessing the security of these standardized schemes.

 

Inspired by the equivalence between LWE and Extrapolated Dihedral Cosets Problem (EDCP) in [Brakerski, Kirshanova, Stehlé and Wen, PKC 2018], we show that the MLWE problem is as hard as a structured variant of the EDCP, which we refer to as the Integer Polynomial Module EDCP (IP-M-EDCP). This extension from EDCP to IP-M-EDCP relies crucially on the algebraic structure of the ring underlying MLWE: the extrapolation depends not only on the noise rate, but also on the ring’s degree. In fact, an IP-M-EDCP state forms a superposition over an exponential (in ring degree) number of possibilities. Our equivalence result holds for MLWE defined over power-of-two cyclotomic rings with constant module rank, a setting of particular relevance in cryptographic applications. Moreover, we present a reduction from IP-M-EDCP to EDCP. Therefore, to analyze the quantum hardness of MLWE, it may be advantageous to study IP-M-EDCP which might be easier than EDCP.

Practical infos

  • Date

    October 02, 2026 (13:45 - 14:45)
  • Location

    IRMAR - Université de Rennes - Campus Beaulieu Bat. 22, RDC, Rennes Amphi Lebesgue
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Next sessions

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