Description
We present a novel, simple technique for proving secrecy properties for security protocols that manipulate lists of unbounded length, for an unbounded number of sessions.<br/> More specifically, our technique relies on the Horn clause approach used in the automatic verifier ProVerif: we show that if a protocol is proven secure by our technique with lists of length one, then it is secure for lists of unbounded length.<br/> Interestingly, this theorem relies on approximations made by our verification technique: in general, secrecy for lists of length one does not imply secrecy for lists of unbounded length.<br/> Our result can be used in particular to prove secrecy properties for group protocols with an unbounded number of participants and for some XML protocols (web services) with ProVerif.
Prochains exposés
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Predicting Module-Lattice Reduction
Orateur : Paola de Perthuis - CWI
Is module-lattice reduction better than unstructured lattice reduction? This question was highlighted as `Q8' in the Kyber NIST standardization submission (Avanzi et al., 2021), as potentially affecting the concrete security of Kyber and other module-lattice-based schemes. Foundational works on module-lattice reduction (Lee, Pellet-Mary, Stehlé, and Wallet, ASIACRYPT 2019; Mukherjee and Stephens[…]-
Cryptography
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Attacking the Supersingular Isogeny Problem: From the Delfs–Galbraith algorithm to oriented graphs
Orateur : Arthur Herlédan Le Merdy - COSIC, KU Leuven
The threat of quantum computers motivates the introduction of new hard problems for cryptography.One promising candidate is the Isogeny problem: given two elliptic curves, compute a “nice’’ map between them, called an isogeny.In this talk, we study classical attacks on this problem, specialised to supersingular elliptic curves, on which the security of current isogeny-based cryptography relies. In[…]-
Cryptography
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