Description
For many mutli-party applications group signatures are important cryptographic primitives that can be used for the purpose of anonymity and privacy. In classical group signatures members of a group are able to sign messages anonymously on behalf of the group. However, there exists a designated authority, called group manager, that initializes the scheme, adds new group members, and is able to open group signatures, i.e., identify the signer. Obviously, in classical group signatures the group manager is given enormous power compared to other group members and is required to be trusted to act as predestinated. On the other hand there exist multi-party applications where such centralized control (trust) is undesirable, e.g., federated (democratic) systems. For this kind of applications it is desirable to have a group signature scheme which provides similar properties but is independent of any centralized control.
Prochains exposés
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Verification of Rust Cryptographic Implementations with Aeneas
Orateur : Aymeric Fromherz - Inria
From secure communications to online banking, cryptography is the cornerstone of most modern secure applications. Unfortunately, cryptographic design and implementation is notoriously error-prone, with a long history of design flaws, implementation bugs, and high-profile attacks. To address this issue, several projects proposed the use of formal verification techniques to statically ensure the[…] -
On the average hardness of SIVP for module lattices of fixed rank
Orateur : Radu Toma - Sorbonne Université
In joint work with Koen de Boer, Aurel Page, and Benjamin Wesolowski, we study the hardness of the approximate Shortest Independent Vectors Problem (SIVP) for random module lattices. We use here a natural notion of randomness as defined originally by Siegel through Haar measures. By proving a reduction, we show it is essentially as hard as the problem for arbitrary instances. While this was[…] -
Endomorphisms via Splittings
Orateur : Min-Yi Shen - No Affiliation
One of the fundamental hardness assumptions underlying isogeny-based cryptography is the problem of finding a non-trivial endomorphism of a given supersingular elliptic curve. In this talk, we show that the problem is related to the problem of finding a splitting of a principally polarised superspecial abelian surface. In particular, we provide formal security reductions and a proof-of-concept[…]-
Cryptography
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