Description
Cryptographic primitives arising from group theory have in the last few years attracted a lot of attention. Unfortunately, up to date most of the existing proposals are still far away from practical applications, not only due to unlucky computational assumptions which later turned out to be invalid. In this talk we address the impact of modern security analysis in the sense of provable security to cryptographic proposals building on group theory, providing examples of security deficiencies in some of the proposed schemes. Motivated by this, we give a theoretical framework for the design of provably secure public key encryption schemes taking non-abelian groups as a base. Our construction is inspired by Cramer and Shoup's general framework and is conceived as a guiding tool towards the construction of provable secure schemes in the standard model (without any idealization assumptions).
Prochains exposés
-
Séminaire C2 à INRIA Paris
Emmanuel Thomé et Pierrick Gaudry Rachelle Heim Boissier Épiphane Nouetowa Dung Bui Plus d'infos sur https://seminaire-c2.inria.fr/ -
Attacking the Supersingular Isogeny Problem: From the Delfs–Galbraith algorithm to oriented graphs
Orateur : Arthur Herlédan Le Merdy - COSIC, KU Leuven
The threat of quantum computers motivates the introduction of new hard problems for cryptography.One promising candidate is the Isogeny problem: given two elliptic curves, compute a “nice’’ map between them, called an isogeny.In this talk, we study classical attacks on this problem, specialised to supersingular elliptic curves, on which the security of current isogeny-based cryptography relies. In[…]-
Cryptography
-