Description
We present a technique for the verification of cryptographic protocols, based on an abstract representation of the protocol by a set of Horn clauses, and on a resolution algorithm on these clauses. This technique allows a flexible encoding of many cryptographic primitives. It can verify a wide range of security properties of the protocols, such as secrecy, authenticity, and limited cases of process equivalences, in a fully automatic way. Furthermore, the obtained security proofs are valid for an unbounded number of sessions of the protocol, in parallel or not.
Prochains exposés
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Endomorphisms via Splittings
Orateur : Min-Yi Shen - No Affiliation
One of the fundamental hardness assumptions underlying isogeny-based cryptography is the problem of finding a non-trivial endomorphism of a given supersingular elliptic curve. In this talk, we show that the problem is related to the problem of finding a splitting of a principally polarised superspecial abelian surface. In particular, we provide formal security reductions and a proof-of-concept[…]-
Cryptography
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